

CHAPTER CONTENTS

• Introduction	213
• The Personalization Hypothesis	215
• A Critical Assessment of the Normative Standard Used for Evaluating Personalization	220
• A Critical Assessment of the Empirical Evidence for Personalization	223
<i>From Institutions/Issues to People?</i>	223
Election Campaigns	223
Media Reporting and Commentating	225
Voting Behavior	227
<i>From Political to Non-Political Personality Traits?</i>	228
Election Campaigns	229
Media Reporting and Commentating	229
Voting Behavior	230
<i>Personalization Revisited</i>	231
• Political Personalization: Toward a Theoretically Grounded Research Agenda	233
• Notes	242
• References	244

8 Personalization of Politics

A Critical Review and Agenda for Research

Silke Adam

University of Bern

Michaela Maier

University of Koblenz-Landau

In this chapter we develop an agenda for future research on the personalization of politics. To do so, we clarify the propositions of the personalization hypothesis, critically discuss the normative standard on which most studies base their evaluation of personalization, and systematically summarize empirical research findings. We show that the condemnation of personalization is based on a trivial logic and on a maximalist definition of democracy. The review of empirical studies leads us to question the assumption that personalization has steadily increased in all areas of politics. Finally, our normative considerations help us develop new research questions on how personalized politics affects democracy. Moreover, this review also makes clear that another weakness of today's empirical research on the personalization of politics lies in methodological problems and a lack of analysis of the impacts of systemic and contextual variables. Consequently, we suggest methodological pathways and possible explanatory factors for the study of personalization.

Introduction

The term "personalization" in politics evokes media pictures of French presidents who, freshly divorced, whisper sweet nothings to former top-models, or of German Ministers of Defence who pose for photographs with their girlfriends in a swimming pool while the military troops are preparing for an assignment abroad. However, these examples represent only one aspect of the phenomenon that is discussed under the label "personalization of politics" in the scientific literature. Personalization in this broader perspective refers to a development in which politicians become the main anchor of interpretations and evaluations in the political process (Holtz-Bacha, Lessinger, & Hetteshimer, 1998)—be it as individuals with political or non-political traits. The claim is that personalization is changing the focus of politics from topics to people and from parties to politicians.

Debates about and studies dealing with processes of political personalization show a strong, but mostly implicit normative focus (Hoffmann & Raupp, 2006). These normative considerations—if indeed articulated—claim that political personalization creates human pseudo events (Boorstin, 1964), downplay the big social/political picture in favor of human triumphs and tragedies (Bennett, 2002, p. 45) and consequently have negative consequences for democracy (e.g., Holtz-Bacha et al., 1998; Kaase, 1994; Keeter, 1987). A concern uttered in such discussions is that the complexity of political processes is reduced to achievements and standpoints of individual politicians instead of a reinforcement of rational opinion-building and decision making. Personalization seems to hamper these rational processes as it is claimed to weaken the influence of current issues and party programs on voting decisions. This concern becomes even more prominent if not only individual people, but their non-political or even private lives, become the focus of attention. In this situation, “aspects of credibility and the humanization of politicians seem more important than e.g. the professional capability of a politician” (Lass, 1995, p. 10; also see Sarcinelli, 1987). This focus on candidates as “attractively packaged commodities” (Dalton & Wattenberg, 1993, p. 208) seems to seduce people into making superficial judgments based on candidates’ styles and looks—casting votes “on feeling” (Keeter, 1987, p. 356). Finally, elections based on such judgments are claimed to be irrational and undemanding, thereby hindering public control of the political process (Keeter, 1987). In addition, such decisions are assumed to be conducted by voters with little political interest and understanding (Dalton & Wattenberg, 1993; Kindelmann, 1994; Page, 1978). Linden (2003) summarizes the concerns underlying most research on personalization in politics: “One is apt to believe that due to the personalization the political parties, along with the parties the political culture, and along with the political culture the democracy would go to the dogs” (p. 1206, own translation).

Many books and articles have been written about the phenomenon of the personalization of politics (e.g., Kepplinger, 1998; Wattenberg, 1995; also see the literature review in this chapter), indicating that this topic has become central to political scientists as well as scholars of political communication (Rahat & Sheater, 2007). So what can we add? We think that it is time to critically review the state of the literature regarding personalization in politics. From this review we seek to develop an agenda that points to future paths research needs to take to understand the process, the reasons for, and the consequences of personalization. To develop such a research agenda, we proceed in four steps. First, we intend to clarify the propositions of the personalization hypothesis and thus define our object of investigation. Second, we critically discuss the normative standard on which most studies on personalization of politics are based. It is against this normative standard that concerns about personalization are uttered. Third, we systematically summarize the empirical state of the art of personalization. In doing so, we concentrate our efforts on quantitative results referring to Western democracies as it would definitely go beyond the scope of this chapter to also review all qualitative work. In addition, we focus

on comparisons across time because personalization is regarded as an increasing phenomenon in politics, and its analysis thus requires a longitudinal perspective. We are aware of the fact that such an endeavor always runs the risk of missing some studies and not taking account of the most current research projects as the publication process takes its time.¹ However, we are confident that the identified normative and empirical shortcomings lead us towards a research agenda for the future (a fourth step). The shortcomings of today’s empirical research show us how we need to proceed if we seek to describe and explain the degree and development of personalization. The discussion of the normative standard against which personalization is evaluated allows us to make progress in understanding the consequences of personalization for democracy. We can show that the assumed negative consequences of personalization are not confirmed empirically and are based on a standard that must be challenged on theoretical grounds. Consequently, we believe that if future research intends to say something about the positive or negative effects of personalization for democratic politics, we need to develop our research questions from more than one normative theory and link them to citizens’ empirical beliefs in legitimacy. Such a broadened perspective will help us to obtain a more balanced evaluation of personalization in politics.

The Personalization Hypothesis

Personalization of politics is a popular concept. Some even claim that “personalization of politics will remain a—perhaps *the*—central feature of democratic politics in the twenty-first century” (McAllister, 2007, p. 585).² However, neither the concept itself nor research related to it are new phenomena: Researchers agree that “personalization of politics is as old as politics itself” (Radunski, 1980, p. 15; see also Briggs & Burke, 2002) as there have always been political actors representing political ideas, goals, and parties, and even empirical evidence for full-fledged image campaigns on the occasion of U.S. presidential elections going back as far as 1840 (Jamieson, 1996). As Halldén (1998, pp. 131–133) puts it, “the course of history is directed by Great Men and Women,” and their “emotional and motivational states” are given as explaining factors for political and social change. Political science has always taken into account this relevance of “political personae” (van Zoelen & Holtz-Bacha, 2000, p. 47). Weber, for example, has compared the charismatic leadership of political actors with wizards (Weber, 2005). And the question regarding the standards on which voters judge political candidates has been crucial to electoral research for many years (for prominent examples see Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1980; Converse & Dupeux, 1966).

However, interest in the phenomenon of personalization was certainly boosted by changes in the political process as well as its framework, e.g., the media system and especially the introduction of television, as well as by some especially meaningful academic contributions in this field (see, for example, Jyengar and Kinder (1987) on priming theory, Hallin (1992a, 1992b) on sound

bite news, and Patterson (1993a) and Jamieson (1996) on horse race journalism and strategic game coverage; below). These developments and insights made personalization a central topic of political communication attention and research in recent years.

Despite the popularity of the concept, there is no consensus on the exact definition of personalization. Holtz-Bacha et al. (1998, p. 241) describe the idea of personalization in a relatively broad manner when they stress that (a) it involves a development over time and that (b) "a person turns into an interpretive framework for complex political facts" constructing political reality. That implies two perspectives (e.g., Brettschneider, 2002; Gabriel & Keil, 2007; Gabriel & Vetter, 1998; Langer, 2007; Lass, 1995; Marcinkowski & Greger, 2000; Reinemann & Wilke, 2007; Sten & Graner, 2002). On the one hand, personalization refers to a stronger focus on candidates/politicians instead of parties, institutions, or issues. On the other hand, the personalization hypothesis claims that it is not only individuals *per se*, but it is their personal, non-political characteristics that become more relevant. The first form of personalization thus identifies the main development from institutions and issues to people; the second form refers to a change in the criteria for the evaluation of politicians from features regarding their professional competence and performance to features concerning non-political personality traits (also see Holtz-Bacha, 2000, 2001a, 2004; van Zoonen, 2006).

This latter proposition of political personalization is problematic. Gabriel and Vetter (1998) have stressed that it is rather complicated to distinguish between political and non-political traits. They suggest that the criteria could be operationalized on a continuum with two opposite endpoints. One end can be described by performance-related features such as leadership qualities and professional or problem-solving competences, which Lass (1995, p. 60) refers to as "role-near, instrumental" criteria (also see Jyengar & Kinder, 1987). The other end summarizes appearance and family circumstances, which Lass (1995, p. 60) refers to as "role-distant" or "value-expressive." In between these two extremes a number of characteristics could be located that can be subsumed under the broader heading of political trust, e.g., credibility and fairplay.

Distinguishing these two perspectives on personalization allows us to point out that the personalization hypothesis is based on at least two propositions. These propositions do not only necessitate different empirical research settings, but also different normative evaluations. To further clarify the personalization hypothesis, we need to address the areas of politics for which these propositions are relevant. Holtz-Bacha et al. (1998) have summarized the corresponding set of research findings and identified three areas that are the subject of studies on personalization in politics³: personalization of election campaigns, personalization of media reporting and commenting⁴, and personalization of voting behavior (also see Brettschneider, 2002; Gabriel & Vetter, 1998; Holtz-Bacha, 2003). In all of these areas, research on both propositions can be conducted.

In studying the change from institutions/issues to people (Proposition 1)

with regard to election campaigns, this form of personalization means that the top-candidates become more important for the campaign compared to the political parties and to the issue positions. This becomes apparent in communication strategies focusing on the candidates (Brettschneider, 2001, 2002)—also to attract the attention of the media (Schulz & Zeh, 2003)—as well as in candidates' freedom to increasingly present themselves as relatively independent from their parties. The stronger autonomy of the candidates *vis-à-vis* the party also becomes visible in the organization of the election campaign (Brettschneider, 2002; Mancini & Swanson, 1996). Professional consultants and campaign managers often replace political parties and their permanent staff in the planning and implementation of election campaigns (also see Holtz-Bacha, 2003). In the context of media's reporting and commenting, research investigates, for example, whether the attention given to candidates increases compared to the attention to political parties or the attention given to issue coverage. Last but not least, Proposition 1 of the personalization hypothesis is also applied to voting behavior. It is stated that the importance of candidate voting has increased compared to issue voting and voting along party lines. Candidate voting in this perspective is based on candidates' evaluation, whereas issue voting results from a comparison between the perceived issue positions of political parties and voters' own viewpoints (Fuchs & Kühnel, 1994).

Proposition 2 can also be applied to all the above-mentioned research areas. Researchers interested in election campaigns study the question of whether politicians are presented in light of non-political traits rather than their competence and performance (Brettschneider, 2008). Similar questions are relevant if one looks for changes in media's reporting and commenting. Also here one can ask whether political candidates are increasingly portrayed in light of their non-political personality traits (Lass, 1995; also see Brettschneider, 2002; Holtz-Bacha et al., 1998). Finally, Proposition 2 is relevant in research on voting behavior. Here, we study whether non-political personality traits have become more important for citizens' decision making at the expense of political character traits (Brettschneider, 2002).

The personalization hypothesis with its two propositions applied to three areas was first developed in the United States. Here, the conditions for processes of personalization are ideal. The candidates running for presidency stand in the center of political campaigns, media coverage, and voting, as they are directly elected by citizens. However, most researchers assume that processes of personalization are not limited to presidential systems like the United States, but also take place in semi-presidential or parliamentary systems, which by their nature are more strongly focused on parties.

Changes in the political process itself are often claimed to foster personalization across political systems (Swanson & Mancini, 1996). The first line of reasoning in this tradition refers to changes in culture, the second line to changes in institutions. Researchers underlining the importance of cultural changes claim that processes of personalization take place as traditional ties between the political system and citizens weaken (Hallin & Mancini, 2003;

Sarcinelli, 1990). Long-term identification with parties declines (Pennings & Lane, 1998; Wirkowski & Holtz-Bacha, 2005), the number of floating voters increases (Ersson & Lane, 1998), and traditional partisan cleavages or strong ideologies vanish (Mazzoleni, 2000). As a consequence thereof, parties use personalization strategies to win their votes. This chosen strategy, however, is assumed to change parties themselves: from mass or catch-all parties to media parties, minimal parties, or professional parties (e.g., Beyme, 1997; for a summary of the party change literature see Wiesendahl, 2001).

The second line of reasoning refers to institutional changes. These changes refer to "the adoption of rules, mechanisms, and institutions that put more emphasis on the individual politician and less on political groups and parties" (Rahat & Shefter, 2007, p. 66). Examples are the introduction of primaries for the selection of political candidates, the launch of televised debates, or the replacement of closed lists by open lists that allow for intra-party competition in elections. For example, when explaining the emergence of two phenomena closely connected with the concept of personalization, i.e., horse race and game schema coverage, Patterson (1993a, 1993b) and Jamieson (1992, 1993; Jamieson & Birdsell, 1988) show that the institutional change of introducing primaries in the United States not only increased the individual campaign activities of the candidates but also boosted personalized media coverage during the nomination process. In several studies the media interest in this phase was shown to be even stronger than during the convention and the general election (see Patterson, 1993a; Robinson & Sheehan, 1983; Lichter, Arundson, & Noyes, 1988; Center for Media and Public Affairs, 1992). In the case of Israel, Rahat and Shefter (2007) showed that changes in candidate selection led to personalization in media coverage, which fostered personalization in the behavior of politicians in parliament. In Germany, Reinemann and Wilke (2007) showed that with the introduction of televised debates, the physical appearance of a candidate gained in importance.

Taking these changes into account, the personalization hypothesis is assumed to be valid in all types of political systems. It assumes an increase in personalization over time. For a hard test of the hypothesis we need to look for processes of personalization within parliamentary systems as these systems are inherently driven by a party logic (Karvonen, 2007). However, the hypothesis does not claim that the total amount of personalized campaigning, media coverage, or voting is the same across different political systems. Moreover, we expect differences in the total amount depending on political context factors, a topic on which we elaborate further in the final section of this chapter.

Changes in the political process are not regarded as the sole reason for the prominence of the personalization hypothesis. Researchers claim that the increase in personalization is connected to at least two developments (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987; Karvonen, 2007; Schulz, Zeh, & Quiring, 2005; Swanson & Mancini, 1996): (a) changes in politics and (b) changes in the journalistic and media systems. Which of these developments proves to be more important is an unsolved question (Schulz, Zeh, & Quiring, 2005). Regarding the media

system, the rise of television has often been connected to processes of personalization (e.g., Hallin, 1992a; Jamieson, 1996, p. 25; Iyengar & Kinder, 1987; Schoenbach, 1994; van Zoanen & Holtz-Bacha, 2000). With its picture-oriented style of presentation and its problems in conveying complex information, television is regarded as a main instrument of personalization (Wirkowski & Holtz-Bacha, 2005). However, Patterson (1993a, p. 81) has pointed out that the where the difference in the styles of television and newspaper reporting is now relatively small" as newspapers today also "heavily rely on the interpretative style of reporting," at least in the United States.

Turning to more recent developments, Patterson (1993a, pp. 78–81; also see Hallin, 1992a) points to a significant change in U.S. journalism since the 1960s, which is a part of Americanization or modernization also affecting other Western societies. First, he argues that journalists' role perception changed from "silent sceptics" to "vocal cynics" (p. 79) in the relationship to politicians as a result of, for example, the Watergate scandal. Second, this higher self-esteem was additionally boosted by the growing public esteem of the profession, which increased with a growing number of TV programs and the number of well-known journalists and reporters. Third, commercial TV further boosted the aggressive style of reporting. As a consequence of these changes in journalism, political campaigns have become "increasingly packaged for television, with a heavy reliance on pacing and visual imagery" (p. 13). The journalists' reaction was no longer to give political actors the opportunity to make extensive verbal statements but rather to ask questions and to the politician, a phenomenon being examined by sound-bite research (Hallin, 1992a). Further on, journalists increasingly focus on campaigns as a strategic game or horse race between the leading candidates (e.g., Foley, 2000; Genz, Schoenbach, & Semetko, 2001; Jamieson, 1993; Keeter, 1987; Patterson, 1991, 1993a; Scammell & Langer, 2006).

The media logic is said to have become more prominent with the introduction of private, commercial television, which occurred more or less simultaneously in all of Europe during the 1980s and 1990s (also see Curran, Iyengar, Lund, Salovaara-Moring, 2009). Since these profit-oriented channels aim to meet the needs and expectations of the average audience, "a short, simple and people-oriented" presentation of politics (Brettschneider, 2002, p. 22) with a focus on infotainment, human-interest stories, and emotions (van Zoanen & Holtz-Bacha, 2000) is assumed to be the result (also see Gabriel & Vetter, 1998; Schoen, 2005; Holtz-Bacha, 2004). In addition, certain media trends such as specific forms of professional up-to-date campaigning are said to boost personalization (e.g., interactive Internet-communication on the one side, but also forms of personal direct-marketing; both seem to become more important due to the individualization of society) (Gronbeck & Wiese, 2005; Holtz-Bacha, 2006b; Langer, 2007; Schmitt-Beck, 2007). However, parallel to differences in political systems, the absolute amount of personalized politics might well

differ according to differences in the media systems (e.g., differences in the importance of private versus public television), as we will also elaborate further in the final section of this chapter.

A Critical Assessment of the Normative Standard Used for Evaluating Personalization

Many studies dealing with the phenomenon of personalization of politics are implicitly or explicitly based on the standards of classic democratic theory, which require that voters' decision making is rational and informed (Bereelson, 1966; Dalton, 2000; Sears & Chaffee, 1979). Such decision making postulates that a voter must have ample information about current political issues and the standpoints of the competing political parties in order to be able to compare his own issue positions with those of the parties to come to a rational voting decision. A prerequisite for citizens' informed and rational decision making is a functioning information flow from the elite to the public (Beierwales, 2000); only if citizens acquire information on the positions and decisions of those responsible can they effectively control the political elite. The critical evaluation of the personalization of politics is directly related to these ideas. If election campaigns and/or media reporting and commenting focus on people instead of issues, on non-political traits instead of political qualities, citizens will lack information for qualified decision making in elections. This curtailing of the information flow to means of symbolic politics calls the basic tenet of democratic decision making into question (Beierwales, 2000; Langer, 2007). The focus on the political candidates or even their personality traits is seen as lacking substance, whereas issue voting is seen as superior and better suited for informed decision making (Brettschneider, 2002; Dalton & Wattenberg, 1993).

Yet the normative evaluation of personalization of politics is based on a *trivial logic*: more personalization automatically is assumed to mean less information about issue positions (for a critical discussion, see Hoffmann & Raupp, 2006). However, Iyengar and Kinder (1987) have found convincing empirical evidence that issue salience is linked to citizens' evaluation of the political competencies as well as to perceived character traits of political actors, and vice versa. And election research until today points to very complex interactions between orientations towards parties, candidates, and issues (e.g., Brettschneider, 2002; Oegema & Kleinmijhuis, 2000; Pan & Kosicki, 1997). Consequently, the process of electoral decision making is not a zero-sum game in which stronger candidate orientation necessarily means a loss of the normatively more significant issue and party orientation (see also Lass, 1995). Iyengar and others (Iyengar, 1989; Iyengar & Kinder, 1987; also see Holtz-Bacha, 1999, 2003; Schulz & Zeh, 2003) argue that issues are actually used for the image construction of candidates, and that campaign managers try to determine the issue contexts in which candidates are presented. Kim, Scheufele, and Shanahan (2005) support this idea when they show that

information about candidates fosters knowledge on the candidates' positions regarding issue positions and therefore contributes to issue voting. In addition, Johnston and Kaid (2002) show that political ads do not just focus on issues or images, but in reality always contain information on both.

In addition, theories of democracy have always acknowledged that the idea of politically well-educated voters who make their voting decision with full information and certainty is unrealistic. As a consequence thereof, researchers have *challenged this maximalist definition of democracy*:

[We] now understand that this maximalist definition of the prerequisites for informed decision making is unnecessary. Instead, our models should look at whether citizens can manage the complexities of politics and make reasonable decisions given their political interests and positions. (Dalton, 2000, p. 922)⁵

One of the front-runners in this tradition is Downs (1968), who highlights the problem of information costs for the average citizen. Consequently, decisions can be rational even though citizens may not be fully informed. In addition, mechanisms are sought to minimize the costs of information gathering. "A rational voter therefore seeks to minimize his information costs by applying mechanisms of information simplification or 'informational shortcuts'" (Fuchs & Kithmel, 1994, p. 315; also see Lau & Redlawsk, 2001; Page, 1978; Popkin, 1991; Wirth & Voigt, 1999).

Voters' reliance on informational shortcuts instead of a rational weighing of standpoints on different issues is not a new phenomenon. Before discussions on political personalization started dominating the field, another shortcut was—and still is—studied intensively: party identification. In contrast, however, to the short-term shortcut personalization, party identification is regarded as a long-term shortcut—a kind of psychological party membership (Campbell et al., 1980). Party identification can impact voting decisions directly or have an indirect influence on short-term attitudes about candidates and issues. Party identification therefore is a classical informational shortcut. As Campbell and colleagues (1980, p. 128) state: "the complexities of politics and government increase the importance of having relatively simple cues to evaluate what cannot be matters of personal knowledge." Some authors even conclude that, from the standpoint of classical democratic theory, short-term shortcuts may come closer to the ideal of an informed, independent voter (Dalton, 2000) than voting according to party identification. Voting along party lines is problematic in the sense that new information on issues, people, or parties is not likely to change voting decisions. Consequently, the likelihood of an effective control of political elites by the electorate is small if long-term party identification is dominant, as governments are not necessarily deselected when they do not represent the will of the electorate (Linden, 2003).

In contrast, different criteria for a person's evaluation have been identified as not only cost-saving, but also rational, relevant, and valuable for decision

making for at least three reasons: (a) in complex decision-processes it seems reasonable to apply evaluation concepts which have proven their worth in everyday life,⁶ (b) it also seems reasonable to draw conclusions on the basis of retrospective experience when making assumptions about the future (also see Mughan, 2000), and (c) even seemingly non-political information can convey politically relevant information. Voting decisions are complex because diverse information about issues, candidates, parties, and political programs has to be evaluated and weighed against long-term political attitudes. In such complex decision processes it seems reasonable that voters rely on criteria that they also apply in more day-to-day evaluations, e.g., when making up their minds about other individuals (Gabriel & Vetter, 1998; Lane, 1978; Lass, 1995; Jamieson & Waldman, 2003). Moral traits such as integrity, honesty, reliability, accountability, credibility, and trustworthiness have been repeatedly named as possible relevant criteria in this context (Dalton & Wattenberg, 1993; Downs, 1968; Gabriel & Vetter, 1998; Just et al., 1996; Kinder, 1986; Langer, 2006; Miller, Wattenberg, & Malanchuk, 1986; Page, 1978; Rahn, Aldrich, Borgida, & Sullivan, 1990; Street, 2004; van Zoonen, 2005). As a second group, Popkin (1991; see also Corner, 2000) introduces candidates' demographic characteristics such as race, ethnicity, age, and localism as important cues "because the voter observes the relationship between these traits and behavior as part of his daily experience" (p. 794). Several researchers (Fuchs & Kühnel, 1994; Gabriel & Vetter, 1998; Mughan, 2000; Popkin, 1991) have specifically pointed out the relevance of retrospective experiences when trying to assess the behavior of a politician after election day. Gabriel and Vetter (1998), for example, stress the importance of trustworthiness: a voter needs to trust that the candidates will represent the interest of the voters on a variety of issues, even those not yet known. For this reason, information about qualities and traits of politicians are recognized as retrospective experiences which voters may use as informational shortcuts. This is not to say that all information about candidates is actually valuable for every voting decision (also Patterson, 1993a). But even a purely visual presentation may contain valuable cues (Bucy & Grabe, 2007, p. 670). And non-political information may become politically relevant depending on the context of the election—e.g., if it is related to political issues or programs—and the priorities of the individual voter (Fuchs & Kühnel, 1994; Lass, 1995; Wirth & Voigt, 1999). For example, the family situation of a politician may not be totally disconnected from his or her vision on child care and gender questions.⁷ Popkin (1991, p. 789) has recognized that "by employing such a cost-saving strategy, the voter does not sacrifice his basic issue orientations; he simply deals with them in a more economic way." Therefore, in summary, we support Kaltefleiter's (1981) view that personalization may be seen as a mechanism that bundles a variety of available information in a political person and helps make democracy work—as we would like to add—by providing a short-term shortcut for voters.

Last but not least, we argue that it is not well-justified that most normative evaluations of political personalization *solely refer to classic democratic*

theory. This one-sidedness overemphasizes the possible problems of personalization discussed here but omits other risks and chances that might be just as relevant. If one evaluates personalization in politics from the standpoint of other strands of democratic theory, we can find not only new benchmark for evaluation, but also new questions that empirical research needs to answer. This broadened perspective will be addressed in the concluding section of this chapter.

A Critical Assessment of the Empirical Evidence for Personalization

Not only is the normative basis for the evaluation of political personalization shaky and one-sided, but also the empirical question of whether personalization actually develops and what consequences it suggests, is not yet answered. However, those who talk about or evaluate it often regard the degree and form of personalization as a new, increasing problem that has developed over time. Langer (2006) criticizes these ready-made preconceptions:

Moreover, because there are stunning instances of the exposure of leaders' personal lives 'everywhere', it has become natural to believe that these suffice as evidence of the strength of the phenomenon, obscuring the need for systematic empirical evidence. (p. 98)

In the following we shed light on the empirical—mostly quantitative—state of research regarding personalization in politics—personalization in election campaigning, in media reporting, and in voting behavior. As the hypothesis is based on a development over time, we are less interested in the absolute amount of personalization than in longitudinal comparisons. The first part of this review deals with Proposition 1, which assumes that the relevance of candidates/politicians has increased over time when compared to political organizations and issues. The second part of this review focuses on Proposition 2, which assumes that non-political traits have become more important over time for the evaluation of political actors than political and management competences and achievements. We will inspect these propositions on the basis of existing empirical research.

From Institutions/Issues to People?

Election Campaigns. It is difficult to assess whether the emphasis in election campaigns has changed from institutions and issues to people and personalities. In this field, few studies have been conducted so far, not many of which cover a long time frame and have an internationally comparative perspective. Often, the research reports contain only qualitative descriptions of the campaigns and the underlying strategies.

One of the few longitudinal studies that cover at least one aspect of election

campaigns (i.e., televised ads) has been conducted by Holtz-Bacha and colleagues (Holtz-Bacha, 2000; Holtz-Bacha et al., 1998; Holtz-Bacha & Lessinger, 2006) for German national elections between 1957 and 2005. The results of this study point out that personalization is not a new phenomenon in political advertising and that there is no continuous trend towards more strategic personalization in the context of elections. Instead, strategies of personalization applied in political advertising depend on the context of the election, e.g., the type of candidates and issues, the party in power in government or the opposition (Holtz-Bacha, 2000; Holtz-Bacha, 2001b; Holtz-Bacha, 2006a). Thus, at least for Germany, it seems that one might agree with Kaltefleiter (1981), who claims that personalized election campaigns have taken place ever since the first national elections. In 1953, for example, the Christian Democratic party canvassed the electorate with the slogan "Germany votes for Adenauer."

Johnston and Kaid (2002) come to a similar conclusion in their study of U.S. presidential campaign ads between 1952 and 2000. They show that political ads have not increasingly focused on candidates' images. In contrast, the campaigns in the 1990s and the first years of 2000 contain the highest percentage of issue ads ever. Instead of a linear time trend, the campaigns differ from election to election. They show, for example, that Eisenhower's campaign in 1952 was strongly focused on issues, whereas in 1956 he ran a campaign based on image constructions. Also Gilens, Yavreck, and Cohen (2007) support this view showing that political ads in the United States have become less character-oriented. From his study of TV ads in the U.S., presidential races between 1952 and 1996, West (1997, p. 47) concludes that emphases on candidates' qualities in specific elections "were more a matter of defusing or highlighting personal qualities important in a particular race than a manifestation of any general trend toward personalistic politics." The trend he describes is one of diminishing party appeals in the ads, which are not necessarily replaced by a stronger emphasis on candidates.

From his comparison of the United States, Germany, and the U.K., Bretschneider (2002) draws similar conclusions: he cannot observe systematic changes in election campaigns that point toward personalization. It is the specific institutional design of the United States (i.e., a presidential system combined with primaries) that gives candidates a very prominent role. Above that, from time to time campaigns are personalized in all countries—e.g., the campaigns of Gladstone and Disraeli in the U.K., Adenauer in Germany, or Eisenhower in the United States. Hodess, Tedesco, and Kaid (2000) come to somewhat different conclusions from their analysis of British party election broadcasts in 1992 and 1997. They characterize the latter election as more candidate driven (Hodess et al., 2000) and thus claim that personalization is increasing, a position that is supported by Scammell and Langer (2006) after analyzing British party election broadcasts between 1992 and 1997. However, it is questionable if such a short time span warrants such a strong conclusion.⁸ In addition, both research teams clearly show that the focus of the ads is still on issues and not on people (Hodess et al., 2000; Scammell & Langer, 2006). Finally, qualitative

studies based on expert opinions of 14 countries claim to find an increase in leader-centered election campaigns (Webb & Pogutke, 2005).

Media Reporting and Commenting. Strong evidence exists that election news coverage in the United States has become increasingly dominated by an emphasis on candidate and party strategy, focusing more on the "horse race" and candidate personalities and very little on campaign issues (Farnsworth & Lichter, 2007; Graber, 2006; Patterson, 1993a). In their analysis of articles appearing in the *New York Times* from 1952 to 2000, Gilens et al. (2007) show that character content has steadily increased, whereas policy content has decreased. Similar patterns have emerged in analyses of election coverage around the world, suggesting that most news coverage tends to focus on campaign strategy and personalization at the cost of issues or party policies (Kaid & Strömback, 2008). This finding is supported by a comparative study of Dalton, McAllister, and Wattenberg (2000). They show that the ratio of candidate to party mentions in the media coverage during elections has increased in four out of five countries, namely the United States, the U.K., Austria, and France, between 1952 and 1997. The strongest increase was in the United States: From 1.7 candidate mentions for every 1 party mention in 1952, this ratio has increased to 5.6 in 1996. However, in Canada, for example, no increase was observed. However, it needs to be mentioned that the levels of personalization between countries still differ drastically. In presidential systems (U.S. and France) the level of personalization is about four times as high as in parliamentary systems.

Studies focusing only on the U.K. also support the first proposition of the personalization hypothesis. Using Harrison's studies on broadcasting coverage, a time series going back to 1964, Foley (2000) and Mughan (2000) reach the conclusion that there was an increase in the visibility of political leaders in television reporting in the 1980s and 1990s (also see Scammell & Semetko, 2008). On the basis of an analysis of *The Times* between 1945 and 1999, Langer (2006) also agrees with this argument, as do Rahat and Sheater (2007) when analyzing media coverage of 16 election campaigns in Israel from 1949 to 2003. In the early years of these election campaigns in Israel, media coverage focused on the parties, followed by a combined focus on parties and candidates. Since the 1981 election, however, the candidates themselves became the focus of attention. This personalized media coverage is accompanied by a focus on conflicts internal to the parties instead of inter-party struggles (Shenhav & Sheaffer, 2008). Following the overview of Karvonen (2007) on the state of empirical research, it seems that studies on the Finnish case also support Proposition 1 regarding media reporting. On the basis of a content analysis of TV newscasts in the context of German elections between 1990 and 2005, Schulz and Zeh (2005, 2006) also come to the conclusion that candidates have become more important for the media coverage since 1990. These findings are supported by expert opinions in 14 countries (Webb & Pogutke, 2005). Bucy and Grabe (2007) show that personalization in U.S. TV coverage takes

on a specific form. It is a visual form of personalization as candidates' sound bites are overshadowed by journalists' voices, whereas candidates' image bites (their presentation without necessarily being heard) gain in importance (see also Hallin, 1992a; Patterson, 1993a).

However, there are studies which point to contrary results regarding personalization in media reporting. In their analysis of the campaign coverage of four quality newspapers in Germany from 1949 to 1998 Wilke and Reinemann (2001, p. 302) could not observe a trend towards personalization: "Neither the amount of references to the candidates, nor the number of candidates' photos or the amount and content of evaluative statements displayed a linear increase in course of time." Although the average degree of personalization has increased in the years after 1980, compared to this slight trend towards personalization, the differences found among the individual elections seem to be far more important (Wilke & Reinemann, 2001). Genz et al. (2001) reach a similar conclusion: For the time period between 1990 and 1998 they did not find a general increase of personalization in the TV news coverage of German national elections at all, but a much stronger focus on the two top-candidates compared to other political actors in 1998 than in 1990 or 1994. In a continuation of their long-term study of German election coverage in quality newspapers, Reinemann and Wilke (2007) show that the relative number of references to candidates in election coverage did not increase drastically with the introduction of televised debates. What it did, however, was to boost the absolute amount of media coverage devoted to the overall campaign. Thus, these data do not support a clear-cut change from institutions/issues to people. In contrast, they indicate that people have been important in election coverage since the beginning: 79% of all campaign coverage made reference to candidates in 1961; 71% in 2005. Jucknat's findings (2007) point in a similar direction. Analyzing media coverage in five German elections (1953, 1961, 1972, 1987, 2002), she underlines the importance of individual candidates in all elections but cannot identify a linear trend. Also Binderkrantz and Green-Pedersen (2009) raise a critical voice regarding personalization of media reporting. In their analysis of public radio news in Denmark between 1984 and 2005, they found no discernible trend outside of election times.

With the exception of the German case, empirical results seem to support Proposition 1 regarding media reporting, at least during election campaigns. However, an agreed upon methodology of how to study personalization is lacking. It therefore becomes extremely difficult to judge whether differences found between countries are real or a methodological artifact. These methodological problems become apparent if one compares studies within one country on the same election. Reinemann and Wilke (2007), for example, identify the election coverage of 1990 as one of the most personalized ones in the history of post-war Germany. In contrast, Kaase (1994, p. 220), who analyzed a broad spectrum of German media, concluded that personalization in 1990 "was not a widespread phenomenon in media information."

Voting Behavior. From a normative point of view, this last area of personalization is the most interesting as it touches upon the question of whether voters' decision making is rational and informed. The role of personalization for the voting decision, the so-called "candidate voting," as well as the orientation of voters to current political issues ("issue voting") are short-term determinants of voting behavior.⁹ A hypothesis formulated in many studies is that in times of decreasing attachments to specific parties, such short-term variables might have gained significant impact (also see Gabriel & Keil, 2007). Whether this hypothesis holds true or not is somewhat hard to judge, since few studies have examined the relevance of candidate voting in parliamentary democracies (also see Brettschneider, 2002).

Existing research, however, points in the direction that candidate orientations have not gained in importance over time, and that they are far less important than is widely believed. In summarizing the results of elections in the United States, the U.K., France, Germany, and Canada from 1960 to 2001, King (2002) does not find a linear trend towards more personalized election outcomes and concludes that "the almost universal belief that leaders' and candidates' personalities are almost invariably hugely important factors in determining the outcomes of elections is simply wrong" (p. 216). Interested in the question of whether candidates actually impact the outcome of elections—not individual votes—he identifies only very few elections where the winning party would not have won any way irrespective of their candidate (King, 2002). In this finding he is supported by various authors conducting empirical studies. In their analysis of open-ended candidate likes/dislikes items in national election studies, Gilens et al. (2007) show that for the United States character-based considerations have even decreased in importance between 1952 and 2000 compared to issue considerations. For all German national elections between 1961 and 2005, Brettschneider, Neller, and Anderson (2006, p. 495) conclude: "the evaluations of the candidates for chancellor play only a small role on the behavior of voters" (also see Falter & Rattinger, 1983; Gabriel & Vetter, 1998; Kaase, 1994; Lass, 1995; Schulz & Zeh, 2005). In her overview of the respective research, Karvonen (2007) also comes to the conclusion that "personalities of party leaders are not among the prime determinants of electoral outcomes in parliamentary democracies" (pp. 8–9, Table 3), and in the same vein Linden (2003) concludes that voting is not becoming more personalized over the course of time.¹⁰ Schoen (2007, 2009) reaches the same result analyzing German national elections between 1980 and 2005 showing that candidate effects varied considerably across elections. This result is also supported by experts' judgments in 14 countries. It is not clear whether voters in parliamentary systems actually cast their ballot in a personalized manner (Webb & Poguntke, 2005).

If candidate voting neither clearly increases over time nor has a strong impact in general, the questions arise (a) whether there is an indirect impact, and (b) whether specific situations exist, in which it may play a crucial role. Turning to the indirect impact first, Lass (1995) points out that although political

parties are more important than candidates in voting; it is the attitudes towards candidates that influence voters' attitudes towards parties. Consequently, "candidates do not occasionally influence the voting behavior independent from party evaluations but they are an integral and permanent part of the perception and evaluation of political parties" (Lass, 1995, p. 191). As well, Brettschneider (2002) points in a similar direction by showing that party identification, issue preference, and candidate voting usually go hand in hand and do not contradict one another. Therefore, he concludes that the direct impact of candidates on the voting decision is very small. Turning to the specific situations in which candidate voting may be important and therefore to understand the variation from election to election and from country to country (and even from region to region; Pappi & Shikano, 2001), Brettschneider (2002) differentiates institutional, situational, and individual factors for explanation. Personalized voting is stronger in institutional settings resembling presidential systems compared to parliamentary systems (see also Pappi & Shikano, 2001). In the presidential voting system of the United States, voting is more strongly determined by the candidates than in the U.K. and Germany (Brettschneider, 2002). The situational factor (see also Kaase, 1994; King, 2002) refers to the current political issues and the people running for office. If parties are hard to differentiate, but the candidates show clear-cut differences, candidate voting becomes more likely. In a study of U.S. presidential elections between 1964 and 1984, Romero (1989) showed that where the electorate's issue responsiveness rises, its responsiveness to party and candidates is lessened. He concludes: "There is an inverse relationship in single elections between the impact of issue evaluations and party and candidate evaluations. Depending upon the specific campaign, issues, party, or the candidates become salient" (Romero, 1989, p. 417). Kellermann's study (2007) must also be interpreted in light of situational factors. Between 1990 and 2005 the relevance of candidate-voting decreased in Germany for the Christian Union parties, while it increased for the Social Democrats. These opposite trends could be explained with the fading importance of former Chancellor Kohl for the CDU/CSU, whereas Gerhard Schröder's star as new "media chancellor" was still rising. Personal factors refer to the party identification of each voter (see also Lass, 1995; Schulz & Zeh, 2005). Those strongly identifying with a party evaluate the candidate of the own party more positively irrespective of the actual person. For these citizens, candidate voting becomes relatively unlikely.

From Political to Non-Political Personality Traits?

The second proposition we want to examine on the basis of empirical studies at hand is whether personalization is a problem because candidates are increasingly portrayed and evaluated on the basis of non-political, symbolic criteria that do not refer to any substantial issue positions. Research has shown that candidates can be evaluated on different dimensions, e.g., issue competence, integrity, leadership qualities, and non-political traits like appearance and taste

(for overviews see Brettschneider, 2002; Kindelmann, 1994; Rahn, Aldrich, Borgida, & Sullivan, 1990; Sigel, 1969; Wirth & Voigt, 1999). The thesis is that non-political characteristics of a person have become more important for the evaluation of a candidate than aspects regarding his or her issue positions, political and management qualities, and achievements. In the following the way in which candidates are presented and evaluated will be analyzed again for the three areas campaign strategies, media reporting, and voting behavior.

Election Campaigns. The question whether election campaigns increasingly build on non-political features of candidates is difficult to answer because there is even less empirical research available for Proposition 2 compared to Proposition 1. Again, the only empirical study that compares election campaigns over a longer time span is to our knowledge the one of Holtz-Bacha and colleagues (Holtz-Bacha, 2000; Holtz-Bacha et al., 1998; Holtz-Bacha & Lessinger, 2006). From this study she concludes that parties hardly use personal attributes of candidates in their campaign strategies. Only 8% of their presentations of party candidates consist of candidates' personal traits (Holtz-Bacha, 2000). However, one can observe differences between the Social Democrats and the Conservatives: Whereas the latter try to connect their candidates with attributes of "competence," the campaigns of the Social Democrats use attributions to a lesser degree although there has been an increase in the attributions made to personal traits since 1990 (Holtz-Bacha, 2000). However, it is doubtful if this is sufficient to speak of a trend towards non-political personalization in election campaigns.

Media Reporting and Commentating. In the field of media content analysis, the data base regarding the longitudinal development of the relevance of non-political traits is better but definitively in need of further development (also see Langer, 2006). The long-term analysis of the press coverage on national elections in Germany between 1961 and 1998 by Wilke and Reinemann (2001) brought the insight that "evaluative statements concerning the personality of a candidate had not received more attention over the years by the media when compared to statements about their competences" (p. 302). The authors found that issue competence and leadership-/manager-skills were reported on more often (43% of all statements) than the personality of the candidates (trustworthiness, decisiveness, honesty, intelligence, sympathy, serenity, 33%), while 11% dealt with the appearance (talent for public speaking, physical appearance), and 4% with their values (e.g., religiousness and conservatism).¹¹ In 2002 and 2005, however, the number of evaluative statements about the candidates in the quality media exploded, which was partly a result of the introduction of televised debates in those years (Reinemann & Wilke, 2007). Compared to previous elections, it is not only the total number of evaluative statements that increased, but the dimensions for candidate evaluation also changed (Reinemann & Wilke, 2007): 23% (2002) and 22% (2005) of all evaluative statements about the candidates dealt with their appearance (e.g.,

retorical skills, media performance, and looks). This is the highest number in Germany since 1949.

In the case of Israel, Rahal and Sheffer (2007) could not find a trend towards a stronger focus on personal characteristics and private lives in their analysis of the election coverage between 1949 and 2003. Coverage of personal traits never exceeded 15% of the news items analyzed. After her analysis of *The Times* for the period between 1945 and 1999, Langer (2006, p. 253) states that "references to leaders' personal lives and associated private qualities are not as prominent as generally assumed." As the portion of statements referring to the persona of a politician did not exceed 12%, she argues that this figure is not large enough "to claim that the personal has taken over the political" (Langer, 2006, p. 254). And even in U.S. presidential elections, Sigelman and Bullock (1991), who analyzed election coverage over 100 years, were not able to find such a trend. All of these studies refer to verbal statements when analyzing candidates' traits, although research shows that, at least for TV, it is the visual image and less the verbal that characterizes personalization (Bucy & Grabe, 2007, p. 669; also see Kepplinger, 1982; Kepplinger & Donsbach, 1987; Kepplinger & Maurer, 2005; Kepplinger, Brosius, & Dahlem, 1994). Which candidate traits, however, are best supported by which visual presentations is so far a question that has not been tackled empirically. Certainly, image bites do not contain arguments or policy positions. Yet, whether they contain information about leadership qualities or only about hair color has not been studied as yet.

Voting Behavior. Most of the empirical studies dealing with the question of which dimensions of candidate evaluation are decisive for voting behavior have concluded that political and management skills, rather than non-political traits, influence voters' decision making.

One of the earlier comprehensive studies in this field was presented by Lass (1995), who found that the perceived integrity of candidates had the strongest impact on the evaluation of the politicians in three German elections (1969, 1976, and 1987). Non-political evaluations, in contrast, turned out to play an inferior role: "Candidate-oriented thinking cannot be disqualified as superficial" (Lass, 1995, p. 192). According to Lass (1995), over time, citizens' images have become significantly more complex and have a stronger cognitive foundation compared to the 1960s. The studies by Brettschneider (2002), Gabriel and Vetter (1998), and Pappi and Shikano (2001) support the findings of Lass. In Brettschneider's (2001, 2002) study, a rare comparative study, non-political character traits had the lowest impact of all candidate characteristics on the candidate-evaluation in Germany, Great Britain, the United States, and their importance did not increase over time. Instead, the competence to solve political problems, integrity, and leadership qualities were the most important determinants. Brettschneider (2002) therefore recapitulated that non-political traits of a candidate might be taken into account by voters, but that they would not be decisive for voting-decisions if the candidate could not convince by his

or her issue competence and leadership-qualities.¹² Also for the United States, Miller et al. (1986) could not detect a trend towards an increasing importance of candidates' personal characteristics compared to performance characteristics. The findings of Mughan (2000), in a study of British elections between 1987 and 1997, show that the "character traits" effectiveness and caring had become more important in the voting decision but are not strong supports for the second proposition of the personalization hypothesis. First, from our point of view, effectiveness in particular can hardly be seen as a non-political trait, and second, the author himself limits his findings by acknowledging that the influence of these traits varies with the political circumstances of individual elections.

One widespread assumption regarding the relevance of non-political traits for the voting decisions in different groups of the electorate is that citizens with fewer cognitive resources are more oriented toward non-political traits of candidates than voters with a very pronounced political knowledge. For the German elections between 1998 and 2005, however, Gabriel and Keil (2007) have shown that this does not hold true. They state that, again, it seems to depend more on the context of a specific election than on the cognitive engagement of a voter whether personality traits or political competences are more important for the voting decision. In contrast, Keeter (1987) was able to detect differentiated effects by analyzing open-ended questions in eight national election studies in the United States. Whereas candidates' personal qualities and traits gained in importance for television-dependent voters since 1964, no such effect could be detected for those who relied on newspapers.

Personalization Revisited

A critical review of the state of empirical research leads us to question McAlister's (2007, p. 584) statement that there is "little doubt that politics has become more personalized over the past half-century." There is only one area of politics where the empirical state of research supports this statement: media coverage. For this we find relatively clear evidence of a movement from parties and issues to people (see also Karvonen, 2007). This finding may be explained by the fact that personalization is one of the most important news factors determining journalistic selection processes (e.g., Galtung & Ruge, 1965; Schulz, 1997). Beyond, media organizations themselves can create new personalized media formats to which they amply refer to within their other programs (Reinmann, 2007; Siebert, 2001).

For the other areas of politics as well as for the second proposition, which claims a development toward non-political evaluation standards, it is questionable whether politics has actually shifted dramatically towards stronger personalization. Hardly any evidence for Proposition 1 is found in respect to voting—even in those countries in which personalization has shaped other areas (for a similar evaluations, see Gabriel & Keil, 2005; Schoen & Weins, 2005). Campaigns, as much as we can tell from the scarce number of studies

at hand, lie between (for a similar evaluation, see Bretschneider & Vollbracht, 2009). It thus seems that the area of politics on which most critical evaluations of political personalization are based—voting behavior—has not changed from parties and issues to people. It is, therefore, a myth on which today's condemnation of personalization in politics is based. This myth refers to the logic that personalization is something exceptionally new. However, it seems to us that candidates for political office and elected politicians have always been very visibly personalized. Wilke and Sprout (2009), for example, even show that already in 1925 and 1932 more than 80% of media articles in the election campaigns for the president of the German Reich were personalized and that journalists were highly interested in politicians' private lives. This visibility is changing depending on different contexts but is not necessarily showing a steady increase over time.

Regarding the second proposition of the personalization hypothesis, we hardly find any evidence of a change from political to non-political personality traits for a candidate's or politician's evaluation. In regard to campaigning, we cannot confirm Proposition 2, although the basis for this evaluation is thin as there are hardly any quantitative analyses available concerning aspects of the form of personalization in political campaigns over the course of time. Therefore, major research efforts are necessary to investigate whether election campaigns are shifting the focus towards non-political traits of politicians. Also, regarding media coverage, we do not observe a stronger focus on non-political evaluation criteria. Thus, the conclusion of Wirth and Voigt (1999) seems to be justified. According to these researchers, the rational choice model of political simplification seems to be confirmed in most studies on media coverage, perhaps with the exception of Germany after the introduction of the televised debates in 2002. Last but not least, the major strand of research also rejects Proposition 2 regarding the influence of personalization on voting behavior. There is hardly any evidence that non-political attributes have become more important for candidate evaluation, preference, or even voting behavior (also see Bartels, 2002; Fiorina, Abrams, & Pope, 2003; Schoen & Weins, 2005). Table 8.1 provides an overview of the empirical status quo.

This empirical review of the state of the art challenges the popular conviction that personalization of politics is an overarching phenomenon that increases sharply in all Western societies. Personalization—at least as far as we can tell from the sparse data available—has not strongly affected voting decisions, and personalization has not yet transformed the political process

Table 8.1 Empirical Evidence for Personalization

Dimensions	Areas	Campaigns	Media	Voting
Proposition 1: Institutions / issues → persons		−/+*	+	−
Proposition 2: Political → non-political traits		−*	−	−

* few studies available

Personalization of Politics 233

into a depoliticized contest in which non-political traits, such as physical appearance, have become increasingly important:

Modern elections, despite what is often said and written about them, are only very seldom beauty contests ... Modern elections remain overwhelmingly *political* contests, and political parties would do well to choose their leaders and candidates in light of that fact. (King, 2002, p. 221)³

Political Personalization: Toward a Theoretically Grounded Research Agenda

Our review has shown that personalization research is characterized by research lacunas in many areas, by methodological problems when measuring personalization, and by an underlying normative (negative) evaluation that can be challenged on theoretical grounds. Consequently, a future research agenda needs to address three core tasks. The first is to improve our ability to *describe* and measure the degree and development of personalization; the second is to *explain* the conditions under which it occurs; and the third is to *evaluate* how personalization might affect democracy.

In order to *describe* the degree and development of personalization and thus overcome today's "inconsistencies" (Rahat & Shefter, 2007, p. 66) in research going beyond the conclusion that the topic is "genuinely unsettled" (Karvonen, 2007, p. 9), it is necessary to standardize the instruments that are employed. As yet, an agreement upon methodology of how one might operationalize personalization is lacking (Kaid & Strömback, 2008). The resulting methodological problems lead to research artifacts claiming different levels and degrees of personalization even if one looks at the same elections (e.g., Reinemann & Wilke, 2007; Kaase, 1994). This standardization is especially challenging in reference to Proposition 2 of the personalization hypothesis. The review has made clear that there is neither consensus on the dimensions on which candidates are evaluated nor on how to differentiate these dimensions on political versus non-political traits (Gabriel & Vetter, 1998). Graber (1972), for example, qualifies only 23% of all mentions of presidential qualities in the media coverage of the U.S. campaign of 1968 as referring to professional capacities, whereas the rest describes candidates' personal attributes, style, and professional image. However, other authors apply a much stricter definition of non-political characteristics. To truly measure whether there is a trend towards the non-political, a good starting point to classify candidates' characteristics on a continuum has been proposed by Gabriel and Vetter (1998, for ideas of how to develop such scales, see Sears & Chaffee, 1979; Miller & Mackuen, 1979; Lang, & Lang, 1979; Dennis, Chaffee, & Choe, 1979; Simons & Leibowitz, 1979; Jamieson & Waldman, 2003). In addition, research on personalization needs to go beyond its focus on verbal statements and also take into account visuals (see e.g., Bucy & Grabe, 2007) and ask which candidate traits are best

carried through which form of presentation (see e.g., Kepplinger, 1982; Kepplinger & Donsbach, 1987; Mutz, 2007).

As the personalization hypothesis implies a development over time, a longitudinal research design is necessary (Kaase, 1994; Krewel, 2008; Langer, 2006, 2007). Only such a research design would allow us to test whether personalization actually increases. If we were to reject this claim, the consequence would not be that people or even their personal traits are irrelevant. Instead, it could just mean that it is an old phenomenon which occurs in variable degrees at certain times, and we should more strongly head towards an understanding of the conditions which explain the degrees and forms of personalized campaigns, news coverage, or voting behavior¹⁴ and of the effects on today's democracies.¹⁵

In this context the *explanation* of personalization or of the different levels of personalized politics requires not only conducting comparative research across time but also across countries. Within such comparative research, countries or time-points need to be replaced by variables that have explanatory power. Future research needs to specify the cultural and institutional factors in regard to the political and media systems that explain under which conditions personalized politics evolves (see also Schoen, 2007).

Earlier in the chapter we described the cultural and institutional changes attributed to the boost in personalization as a longitudinal trend. We described the weakening of political identification and the increase of voters' volatility as such a cultural development and changes in the process of candidate selection as such an institutional development. In regard to media, we referred to the changes in role-perceptions of journalists (cultural) and the introduction of commercial television (institutional). As we concluded, these factors are often claimed to be responsible for the increase of personalization of politics over time. Yet, these trends do not affect all countries equally because system-level variables still differ (see for the limits of homogenization, Hallin & Mancini, 2004; Benson & Hallin, 2007). A closer look at these system-level variables may therefore help us to (a) understand the differences in the absolute amount of personalization in different countries and (b) predict how system-level changes impact upon personalization.

Important macro-level variables can be identified with regard to the political system. Those political systems rooted in *parties* with loose ideological and organizational ties to the electorate more easily allow for personalization compared to those with clear ideological orientations (Hallin & Mancini, 1984; Schoen & Weins, 2005). Most Western democracies have experienced a decline of party loyalty. However, large differences prevail. For the United States, for example, Hallin (1992a, b) sees dramatic shifts with the breakdown of the political consensus leading to a fragmented and adversarial political system that is accompanied by a journalist-centered form of critical reporting, which shows the visuals of politicians while leaving the interpretations to journalists.

Further, differences between countries prevail also regarding the *selection*

of candidates running for presidency or prime minister. Personalization is boosted in those systems in which members or supporters of a party can directly decide on a party's candidate in primaries or caucuses compared to those systems in which leading party committees internally decide who is going to run. Primaries or caucuses—as introduced in the United States as a result of the McGovern-Fraser Commission Report in the early 1970s—force candidates to convince party members, supporters, campaign sponsors, and the media of their competence, experience, leadership qualities, and integrity. These are all person-centered heuristics (Brady & Johnston, 1987). In such a system, traditional party functions are handed over to the mass media, which serve as an intermediary to inform rank-and-file voters about potential candidates (Patterson, 1993a, pp. 34–37).

In addition, *presidential systems* (e.g., U.S., France) with their directly elected, single executive who is independent of parliamentary majorities (see Lijphart, 1999) are more strongly focused on the person compared to *parliamentary systems* (see also Hallin & Mancini, 1984). In the latter, personalization is hampered because prime ministers share power with their cabinet, and they are dependent on the parliament for election and potential dismissal. Consequently, any institutional change towards a stronger presidential type of democracy (e.g., the introduction of direct elections of the prime minister in Israel in 1996) is likely to trigger the process of personalization.

Furthermore, political systems can be differentiated into *majoritarian* (e.g., the U.K.) and *consensus democracies* (e.g., Switzerland; Lijphart, 1999).¹⁶ Majoritarian democracies are responsive to the majority of citizens, whereas consensus democracies are responsive to as many people as possible and therefore based on inclusiveness, bargaining and compromise. One may expect that majoritarian democracies show stronger tendencies for personalization compared to consensus democracies. Why? Classical majoritarian democracies are characterized by (a) a stronger leader focus on the prime minister as (s)he can govern without being bound into coalitions in the executive and is superior in power compared to the parliament, (b) a two-party system which allows focusing on two leaders only (see Hallin & Mancini, 1984), and (c) an electoral system in which the winning candidate takes it all. In contrast, consensus democracies are linked to proportional representation based on party lists (see also Strömback & Dimitrova, 2006).

In addition, one might also expect variation in the degree of personalization in consensus democracies because these differ regarding the *mode of election*: Some combine proportional representation based on party lists with personalized modes of elections (e.g., mixed member proportional formula in Germany and New Zealand or single transferable vote in Ireland; see Lijphart, 1999, p. 148f). In those systems where there are personalized modes of elections, we expect stronger personalization than in party-list proportional systems. With a focus on Germany, Klingemann and Wessels (1999, p. 18) show that the mixed electoral system contributes to a “personal vote at the grass roots.” According to Holtz-Bacha (2006b, p. 18), it is specific parties that personalize their cam-

paings: In mixed member proportional systems, where the first vote is for the candidate and the second for the party, smaller parties normally go for the second vote and therefore have less personalized campaigns.

Finally, political systems differ regarding their habitual *style of campaign communication*. In countries with televised debates between the leading candidates, personalization is promoted. Latest evidence here comes from Germany. With the introduction of televised debates in 2002, personalization of national campaigns has increased (Maurer & Reinemann, 2007; Wilke & Reinemann, 2006, pp. 321–323; Holtz-Bacha, 2006b, p. 21). However, as the number of these debates has declined in 2005 and 2009, it becomes clear that this is an institutional factor likely to affect short-term changes in the degree of personalization.

With regard to the national media systems as possible explanatory factors, Hallin and Mancini (1984, p. 830, 2004; see also Wiorkowski & Holtz-Bacha, 2005, p. 175) argue that the degree of commercialization of the media system affects not only the media content but also the form of representation and in both ways determines the degree of personalization. A “commercial imperative” in general leads to an “essentially cinematic [style of reporting], combining visual imagery with narrative structure” (Hallin & Mancini, 1984, p. 839). As commercialization is most prominent in what Hallin and Mancini (2004) call “liberal media systems” (U.S., Canada, Ireland—and to a lesser degree the U.K.), one can expect a more dramatized, personalized, and popularized style of reporting there. The pioneering case in this respect is the United States. Yet, with the rise of private broadcasters, commercialization has also invaded European media systems. Research shows that a higher degree of commercialization seems to boost personalization even in public broadcasting (Curran et al., 2009; Schulz & Zeh, 2006, p. 300). However, countries still differ regarding the importance of public broadcasters. In countries with solid public funding, market pressures are less severe for public broadcasters, which might let us expect less personalization.

These macro-level factors are important to consider in future research seeking to understand differences and changes in the degree of personalization between countries. What needs to be done is to analyze the relative importance of these factors and their interactions. However, these system-level variables are not suitable to account for variation between different elections within the same country and between different organizations/parties. To understand such variation in personalized politics, future research must also focus on meso-level and situational factors.

On an organizational level, we might expect that catch-all parties, or parties with a loose ideological profile, conduct more personalized campaigns compared to single-issue parties, as a clear focus on issue positions might be risky taking into account the diverging interests and expectations of catch-all parties’ heterogeneous voter-groups (Wiorkowski & Holtz-Bacha, 2005). On this organizational level, we may also expect differences between media organizations. Those news organizations that need to cater to a mass taste (e.g., the

boulevard press) are more likely to rely on people and their non-political traits in transporting information compared to those news organizations that cater more strongly to the elites. Personalization in this perspective is not an exclusive feature of television, but of popular commercial media in general (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p. 278).

And third, the degree of personalization of election campaigns and media coverage may also vary due to the specific context of an election (e.g., the constellation of parties, candidates, and topics; see Holtz-Bacha, 2000; Wilke & Reinemann, 2000; Schulz & Zeh, 2006). One interesting example for how the party constellation may influence the degree of personalized politics is the emergence of new political parties, a phenomenon which is not so infrequent at all (e.g., when looking at the spectrum of parties competing in the European parliamentary elections 2009 in many south and eastern European countries). Holtz-Bacha (2006b, p. 10) has described that the interest of the media is especially high in the top candidates of such new parties due to the novelty factor.

But independent from the novelty factor, the candidate constellation itself also seems to have a significant influence on the decision to choose a personalized campaign strategy or not. The question of whether a candidate is willing to participate in a strongly personalized campaign or prefers to focus on issues instead is a momentous decision (Holtz-Bacha, 2006b). Besides personality traits and strategic convictions, candidates’ experiences in former elections might boost or hinder personalization. Further, the popularity of the candidates has implications for the interests of the parties. If a candidate is significantly more popular than the opposite candidate, the party will, of course, try to build on this advantage. Also, if the candidate is more popular than his/her own party, the attempt to transfer this positive image to the party by focusing on the candidate makes sense. This seems to be especially promising if the image of the candidate is linked with positive memories of his actions and achievements during his term in office. Such memories very often also provide good opportunities for visual representation (see also Holtz-Bacha, 2006b).

A rather new field of research looks at whether the involvement of women in election campaigns fosters personalization. Holtz-Bacha (2006b, p. 24) argues that female candidates receive more attention in campaigns, which leads to a higher degree of personalization (e.g., of the media coverage) simply because the uncommonness of their involvement makes them more interesting than male candidates. But there are also those who suggest that the physical attraction of female candidates and the possibilities this offers for visualization boost personalization (e.g., Dillenburger, Holtz-Bacha, & Lessinger, 2005). Schulz and Zeh (2006, pp. 280–281) argue that women are judged more often on the basis of “emotions, appearance and gender... They are represented rather on the basis of female characteristics and put in context with ‘female’ topics. Their family lives and personality get more attention than their political program.”

As a last situational factor, the constellation of issues and topics has been identified as a good predictor for personalized election campaigns. In general, Holtz-Bacha (2006b) has identified the economic and political situation of a

country as relevant context factors. More specifically, Wiorkowski and Holtz-Bacha (2005; see also Holtz-Bacha, 2006b) have found personalization to be a strategy with the goal to distract from unpleasant issues either at present or those may arise after the election (e.g., possible coalition partners).

Finally, research needs to tackle the question of how personalization or personalized politics *impact* upon democracy—and thus how one might evaluate personalization/personalized politics. It is not sufficient to study the impact of the verbal dimension of personalized politics while totally neglecting the impact of visuals (see for this claim Lowry & Shidler, 1995). The visuals might be the trigger that actually makes the difference. Although widely assumed to change politics, to date researchers have hardly been able to document how TV differs from other media in its content and implications (Mutz, 2007, p. 632). This search for consequences of personalization/personalized politics has methodological as well as normative implications. From a methodological point of view, one has to go beyond solely relying on surveys or content analysis, which for themselves are not sufficient to detect effects. For determining such effects, one needs to combine content analysis and surveys, or one needs to conduct experimental research (Holtz-Bacha, 2003; Kaase, 2000; Klein & Ohr, 2001; Mutz, 2007).

To evaluate how personalization/personalized politics affect democracy, there are in general two ways to proceed. First, one may study the impact of personalized politics on citizens' attitudes towards the political system and regime. In this perspective democracies would be affected by personalized politics as citizens' empirical beliefs in legitimacy change (Nohlen, 2002). Second, one may derive normative standards from theories of democracy and ask how personalization/personalized politics affect the quality of democracy as described by these normative standards. In this perspective the normative core of a democracy would be affected by personalized politics (Nohlen, 2002). These two paths for research pose different research questions. Yet, to answer them we need to draw on empirical research.

Turning to possible effects on citizens' empirical beliefs in the legitimacy of a political system, one may rely on Easton (1965). He distinguishes three relevant types of attitudes towards a democracy: attitudes towards the authorities who are responsible for day-to-day politics, the regime, which equals the constitutional order, and the political community. Personalized politics is likely to be connected to the attitudes towards the authorities. Research on second-level agenda-setting, for example, states that media's emphasis on substantive and affective attributes of candidates is linked to opinions about these candidates (e.g., Kim & McCombs, 2007). Other researchers have shown that the visual presentation of political elites in the media influences their evaluations (e.g., Kepplinger & Donsbach, 1987; see also Bucy, 2000; Baileenson, Iyengar, Yee, & Collins, 2008). In addition, research has shown that the type of framing influences responsibility attributions (Iyengar, 1989). Episodic framing, which is often used by personalized reports (for this connection, see Boykoff & Boykoff, 2007), leads citizens to emphasize individual responsibility, whereas

thematic framing points to the responsibility of the state, the authorities. Further, we might hypothesize that such attitudes towards the authorities have the potential to also affect the empirical beliefs in the legitimacy of the regime and the political community. Yet until today, there are no empirical studies that have validated this claim.¹⁷ Positive evaluations of political candidates might foster citizens' beliefs in the legitimacy of the regime or the community, whereas negative evaluations might have the opposite effect. We would assume that a negative impact of personalized politics on empirical beliefs in democracy is most likely in parliamentary systems because here the focus on a person does not go along with the power of this person in the political process. Personalized politics without political power and responsibility (Campus, 2002) might easily lead to frustration (Bartolini, 2006) on the side of the electorate.

Whether personalized politics affects the quality of a democracy as defined by normative theories has often been assumed but hardly ever been empirically tested. So far most researchers have connected personalization/personalized politics with the basic standard for a liberal democracy: an informed and rational control of the elites by citizens. If election campaigns and/or media reporting and commenting focus on people instead of issues, on non-political personality traits instead of political qualities, citizens are assumed to lack the information necessary for qualified decision making in elections. Following up on our critique of the normative standards for evaluation that such reasoning is trivial and neglects the importance of informational shortcuts for citizens, we want to propose a counter-hypothesis, which will hopefully help place the effect of personalized politics on the quality of information flows on the top of future research agendas.

This counter hypothesis builds on the experiences with the European Union. Research on recent European Parliament elections has clearly validated that national parties avoid placing emphasis on the leaders and personalities who would represent the party in Strasbourg to avoid shedding light on parties' internal disputes on EU integration (e.g., for the German party TV ads in 2004 see: Esser, Holtz-Bacha, & Lessinger, 2008; Maier & Maier, 2008; Wiorkowski & Holtz-Bacha, 2005). In addition, this lack of personalized politics does not only shape parties' communication but also media coverage. The lack of familiar faces in Europe accompanied by the lack of clear-cut accountability has been identified as one crucial factor in explaining why it is so difficult for the EU to gain the attention of national mass media (e.g., Gerhards, 1993; Peter & de Vreese, 2004). In this vein Meyer (1999) concludes that "[w]ithout the personalization of political debate and decision processes, political accountability remains invisible" (p. 633). Adam (2007a, 2007b) also points in a similar direction when she shows that it is national politicians who give European politics a face and therefore influence whether European issues are debated in a country or not. Politics without personalization thus runs the risk of being ignored in public debate as its logic does not fit with the news value of the main transmitters, the mass media. Further research, therefore, needs to address the question whether personalization and/or personalized politics

is fostering the existence of the normatively desirable informed citizen. So far empirical research has focused on the general ability of mass media to foster citizens' political knowledge (for an overview see Maier, 2009). Yet, even here the results are inconsistent. The same holds for research on the effects of paid advertisement on voters' knowledge (e.g., Freedman, Franz, & Goldstein, 2004; Huber & Arceneaux, 2007; see also Jamieson et al., 2000 for ads and TV debates). Even more limited is our knowledge on how personalized information affects citizens' knowledge: Does it increase knowledge acquisition (e.g., Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Graber, 2001; Beniger & Jones, 1990) or not (e.g., Prior, 2003)?

However, as argued previously, to focus only on the informed and rational control of the elites proposed by classic democratic theory is narrow and does not adequately take into account the breadth of today's theories of democracy. To deal with this plurality and thus to truly examine the question of the impact of personalized politics/personalization on the core standards of our democratic theories, we also consider basic ideas of pluralist, participatory, and discursive theories. Since these strands of theory are sometimes hard to clearly differentiate and the views of some authors even shift over time in the course of their writings, we confine ourselves to several principle ideas to widen the research agenda on the consequences of personalization.

Pluralist theories of democracy are founded on the idea that the state allows all interests to equally access the political system, thereby avoiding power concentration (e.g., Fraenkel, 1991; for a summary, see Beierwales, 2000; Schmidt, 1995). In reference to the criterion access, personalization/personalized politics could be evaluated critically. One might argue that personalized politics has the potential to increase the inequality of interest representation in politics. Personalized politics gives those with high status and prominence an advantage. It is easier for them to access the media (Wolfsfeld, 1997), because they better fit the news values. This is also what Kernell (1988) refers to when he shows that only few politicians are prominent enough to directly address the public instead of negotiating in parliament. This strategy as part of personalized politics is called "going public." As a consequence, democracies are assumed to become more populist when focused on leader personalities (Kriesi, 2001). Personalized politics might also give specific people an advantage in campaigning, with possible effects, for example, on the candidate recruitment process (Freedman et al., 2004) money-wise or appearance-wise. Thus, personalization/personalized politics might increase the inequality in access to the political system. In this perspective it is not only the fact that interests have different potentials to be organized (Olson, 1965), but also that those interests promoted by the prominent and the prestigious or the more active have better chances to be articulated. Yet, empirical research needs to show whether and how personalized politics contributes to inequalities in access.

From the standpoint of participatory democracy (e.g., Barber, 1984; for a summary see Ferree, Gamson, Gerhards, & Rucht, 2002; Schmidt, 1995), participation is a value per se. Personalization in this perspective might be

valuable as it has the potential to foster participation of those normally less involved in the political process (e.g., Langer, 2007; Schultz, Zeh, & Quiring, 2005). Mazzoleni (2000), for example, claims that personalized leadership is one of the main factors that accounts for political motivation and participation. Personalization, he claims, "appeals to symbolic politics, to political emotions and the deeper needs of personal and subcultural identification" (Mazzoleni, 2000, p. 328) and thus might "drive substantial sectors of lukewarm electors to cast a ballot in favor of political leaders" (p. 328). Empirical research, so far, still struggles with the question whether and how mass media usage in general affects participation (e.g., Scheufele, 2002) or the question of the impact of paid political ads on participation (e.g., Freedman et al., 2004; Huber & Arceneaux, 2007; Jamieson, 2000). Research is needed to understand the specific effects of personalized information on voter participation.

Finally, turning to discursive theories of democracy (for this term, see Ferree et al., 2002), which are closely linked to participatory theories (see Schmidt, 1995), participation alone is not sufficient but needs to be accompanied by a well-functioning process of opinion formation. "The notion of a deliberative democracy is rooted in the intuitive ideal of a democratic association in which justification of the terms and conditions of association proceeds through public argument and reasoning among equal citizens" (Cohen, 1989, p. 17). A prerequisite for this process is the acceptance of others as legitimate speakers. To date only few studies (e.g., Moy & Gastil, 2006) have tackled the question of how mass media affect deliberative conversions. Even less empirical studies (e.g., Mutz, 2007) search for the role of personalized information for deliberations. Whether personalized politics supports such discursive reasoning is questionable. Personalized politics is likely to give those arguments that are supported by prestigious and prominent speakers an advantage and thus might contradict the idea that the quality of an argument is more important than the person giving voice to it (Ferree et al., 2002). In addition, one may ask how specific forms of personalized presentations affect our acceptance of others as legitimate speakers. In this vein, Mutz (2007) has shown in her experimental research that television discourses that portray public actors in an intimate way and in which the actors interact disrespectfully with each other, do indeed increase citizens' knowledge about the arguments of the opposition. At the same time this personalized presentation of politics lowers the regard for the other side, and therefore citizens "come to perceive that the opposition is unworthy and illegitimate" (Mutz, 2007, p. 633). If this finding holds, today's presentation of candidates on TV would hinder political deliberation as it degrades those with opposing views. An overview how the discussed normative standards link to an empirical research program is presented in Table 8.2.

By critically reviewing the empirical and normative state of the art regarding personalization of politics we have developed an agenda for future research. Such research needs to overcome methodological weaknesses (describe), to systematically use comparative research in order to understand personalization as a dependent variable (explain), and to study the consequences of personal-

Table 8.2 Linking Normative Standards to Empirical Research Questions

<i>Normative standard</i>	<i>Empirical questions: Personalization / personalized politics</i>
Informed / rational control of elites (classic theory of democracy)	... hinders or fosters information flows?
Equal access to the political process (pluralist theory of democracy)	... increases the inequality because those with high status have an advantage?
Participation in the political process (participatory theory of democracy)	... fosters participation?
Discursive reasoning (discursive theory of democracy)	... hampers discursive reasoning because the status of a person is more important than the strength of the argument ... weakens the acceptance of others as legitimate speakers?

ization/personalized politics for our democracies (evaluate). This last step is decisive if we want to go beyond a simple condemnation of personalization/personalized politics. Only after having clarified how personalization or personalized politics affects citizens' empirical beliefs in the legitimacy of the political system, the informed and rational control of the elites, the access to the political system, citizens' participation, and the quality of discursive reasoning, can we arrive at a sound judgment of the issue under discussion. These old and new questions can only be answered if empirical research broadens its focus and overcomes its existing deficits.

Notes

1. For a summary of the state of the art, in addition to a standard literature research including a search in the ISI Web of Knowledge and in Communication Abstracts, the following scientific journals were systematically searched for publications dealing with personalization for all volumes between 2000 and 2008: *Communication Research*; *Communication Theory*; *Communications*; *Communication, Culture and Critique*; *Communication Yearbook*; *European Journal of Communication*; *Global Media and Communication*; *Human Communication Research*; *Information, Communications and Society*; *International Communication Gazette*; *Journal of Applied Communication Research*; *Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media*; *Journal of Communication*; *Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly*; *Journalism and Communication Monographs*; *Journal of Public Relations Research*; *Mass Communication and Society*; *Media, Culture and Society*; *Medien & Kommunikationswissenschaft*; *Media Perspektiven*; *Media Psychology*; *New Media and Society*; *Nordicom Review*; *Political Communication*; *Publizistik*; *Television and New Media*; *Visual Communication*; *Visual Communication Quarterly*; *Zeitschrift für Medienpsychologie*.
2. Most authors look for personalization during election campaigns. However,

the question of personalization in politics could as well be studied—and would probably be as relevant—in between elections.

3. Rahat and Sheaffer (2007) propose a slightly different classification: They distinguish between institutional, media, and behavioral personalization. The latter can be observed in the behavior of politicians or of the public. The most distinct feature of this typology compared to the one used here is institutional personalization, which means the "adoption of rules, mechanisms, and institutions that put more emphasis on the individual politicians" (Rahat & Sheaffer, 2007, p. 66), e.g., an open list in elections, primaries. This stronger focus on developments within politics per se is also reflected in research on the "presidentialization" (e.g., Webb & Poguntke, 2005). Here, the growth of leadership power is not only studied in the electoral face (campaigns, media coverage, voting) but also regarding the power distribution within parties and political executives.
4. The authors acknowledge that personalization might also be taking place in media genres not usually covered in the studies analyzing media reporting and commenting (e.g., TV-entertainment formats and magazines, etc.). However, the normative concerns regarding personalization usually address the development of classical news formats of TV and newspapers.
5. Berelson (1966) comes to a similar conclusion when he writes: "Actually the major decisions the ordinary citizens is called upon to make in a modern representative democracy involve basic simplifications which need not rest upon a wide range of information so long as they are based upon a certain amount of crucial information, reasonably interpreted" (p. 494).
6. That personalization can help reduce the complexity of the political process and thus also the costs of information seeking is underlined not only by political scientists, but also by various other disciplines (Hoffmann & Raupp, 2006). Psychologists, for example, describe this complexity reduction of personalization in schema theories and sociologists refer to this mechanism of complexity reduction when systems need to communicate.
7. A similar argument is proposed by Holtz-Bacha (2000) who points out that only through personalization can difficult political concepts be communicated to the citizens.
8. Johnston and Kaid's (2002) results covering a period of 50 years show us how cautious one needs to be about trends. Whereas one finds an increase in personalization in the 1970s and 80s, this trend seems to have reversed in later years.
9. For a variant of the social-psychological model of voting behavior, see Brettschneider (2002).
10. Only few studies come to the conclusion that personalized voting has become more important respectively has increases over time. Kaltefleiter (1981), for example, claims that about 50% of the changes in voting behavior between two elections can be explained by the evaluation of the top candidates. Analyzing time series from the years 1961 to 1998 (Ohr, 2000), respectively 1972 to 1998, Ohr (2002) comes to the conclusion that the overall evaluation of the top candidates of the two major German parties has a significant impact on the voting decision and has significantly increased since 1994.
11. Regarding the ratio of personalized versus non-personalized news items, these findings are in line with the results from a content analysis of German TV-news reports during the 1998 German elections by Wirth and Voigt (1999; also see Kindelmann, 1994).

12. This conclusion is also supported by a number of cross-sectional analyses by Klein and Ohr (2000, 2001; Ohr, 2000, 2002) in the context of the German national elections 1998 and 2002. Although in the specific constellation of the 1998 election they found that in the case of Gerhard Schröder non-political traits, such as the evaluation of his private life and physical attraction, in addition to his trustworthiness and integrity, were more important for the voting decision than were the political competences of the candidate. In their analysis of the 2002 German national elections their results were more in line with the mainstream. In the latter analysis they concluded that for the voting decision party identification and the competence of the parties to solve problems ranked ahead of the personality traits of the candidates.
13. The widespread discussion on personalization might lead to a paradoxical effect that has been formulated by Webb and Poguntke (2005): "Indeed one may say that this perception of the importance of leaders is what really matters: even if leaders actually only have a modest direct effect on voting behavior, the fact that the strategists tend to be convinced of their importance nevertheless results in campaigns which are increasingly centered on party leaders" (p. 346; also see Blumler, 1990; Patterson, 1989).
14. We speak of personalized politics if voters substitute issues/parties (Proposition 1) or non-political traits substitute political traits of candidates (Proposition 2). Yet, here we do not assume a linear trend in the course of time.
15. In this context Dalton and Wattenberg (1993) have called for a stronger focus on the new democracies of Eastern Europe, because here strong ties and images of parties are lacking and therefore images of individual candidates might be more important.
16. In principal, presidential as well as parliamentary systems fit into these categories (Lijphart, 1999).
17. Cappella and Jamieson (1996) have made a first step in this direction when they show that the exposure to strategy frames (part of such frames is an emphasis on the candidates' performance, style, and perceptions) increases citizens' cynicism.

References

- Adam, S. (2007a). Domestic adaptations of Europe: A comparative study of the debates on EU enlargement and a common constitution in the German and French quality press. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, 19(4), 409–433.
- Adam, S. (2007b). *Symbolische Netzwerke in Europa. Der Einfluss der nationalen Ebene auf europäische Öffentlichkeit. Deutschland und Frankreich im Vergleich* [Symbolical networks in Europe. The influence of the national level on the European public sphere. A comparison of Germany and France]. Köln, Germany: Halem.
- Bailenson, J. N., Iyengar, S., Yee, N., & Collins, N. A. (2008). Facial similarity between voters and candidates causes influence. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 72(5), 935–961.
- Barber, B. R. (1984). *Strong democracy: Participatory politics for a new age*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Bartels, L. M. (2002). The impact of candidate traits in American presidential elections. In A. King (Ed.), *Leaders' personalities and the outcomes of democratic elections* (pp. 44–69). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Bartolini, S. (2006). Mass politics in Brussels: How benign could it be? *ZSE*, 1, 28–56. doi:10.1515/ZSE.2006.002
- Beierwaltes, A. (2000). *Demokratie und Medien. Der Begriff der Öffentlichkeit und seine Bedeutung für die Demokratie in Europa* [Democracy and the media. The concept of the public and its relevance for democracy in Europe]. Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos Verlag.
- Beniger, J. R., & Jones, G. (1990). Changing technologies, mass media, and control of the pictures in people's heads: A preliminary look at U.S. presidential campaign slogans, 1800–1984. In S. Kraus (Ed.), *Mass communication and political information processing* (pp. 149–170). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Bennett, W. L. (2002). *News: the politics of illusion* (5th ed.). New York: Longman.
- Benson, R., & Hallin, D. C. (2007). How states, markets and globalization shape the news: The French and US national press, 1965–97. *European Journal of Communication*, 22(1), 27–48.
- Berelson, B. (1966). Democratic theory and public opinion. In B. Berelson & M. Janowitz (Eds.), *Reader in public opinion and communication* (pp. 489–504). New York: Free Press.
- Beyme, K. von (1997). Funktionenwandel der Parteien in der Entwicklung von der Massenmitgliederpartei zur Partei der Berufspolitiker [Changing functions of political parties in the evolution from member parties to parties of professional politicians]. In O. W. Gabriel, O. Niedermayer & R. Stöss (Eds.), *Parteiendemokratie in Deutschland* (pp. 359–383). Opladen, Germany: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Binderkrantz, A. S., & Green-Pedersen, C. (2009). Policy or process in focus? *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, 14(2), 166–185.
- Blumler, J. G. (1990). Elections, the media and the modern publicity process. In M. Ferguson (Ed.), *Public communication: The new imperatives. Future directions for media research* (pp. 101–114). London: Sage.
- Boorstin, D. J. (1964). *Das Image oder Was wurde aus dem Amerikanischen Traum?* [The image or what happened to the American dream?] Hamburg: Rowohlt.
- Boykoff, M., & Boykoff, J. (2007). Climate change and journalist norms: A case-study of US mass-media coverage. *Geoforum*, 38, 1170–1204.
- Brady, H. E., & Johnston, R. (1987). What's the primary message: Horse race or issue journalism. In G. R. Orren & N. W. Polsby (Eds.), *Media and momentum: The New Hampshire primary and nomination politics* (pp. 127–186). Chatham, NJ: Chatham House.
- Brettschneider, F. (2001). Candidate-Voting. Die Bedeutung von Spitzenkandidaten für das Wahlverhalten in Deutschland, Großbritannien und den USA von 1960 bis 1998 [Candidate-Voting. The significance of top candidates for the electoral behaviour in Germany, Great Britain and the USA from 1960 till 1998]. In H.-D. Klingemann & M. Kaase (Eds.), *Wahlen und Wähler. Analysen aus Anlass der Bundestagswahl 1998* (pp. 351–100). Wiesbaden, Germany: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Brettschneider, F. (2002). *Spitzenkandidaten und Wahlerfolg: Personalisierung — Kompetenz — Parteien; ein internationaler Vergleich* [Top candidates and electoral success: Personalization — competence — parties; an international comparison]. Wiesbaden, Germany: VS.
- Brettschneider, F. (2008). Personalization of campaigning. In W. Donsbach (Ed.), *The international encyclopedia of communication* (Vol. 8, pp. 3583–3585). Oxford, UK: Blackwell.

- Bretschneider, F., & Vollbracht, M. (2009). Personalisierung der Unternehmensberichterstattung [Personalization of news coverage of business companies]. In M. Eisenegger & S. Wehmeier (Eds.), *Personalisierung der Organisationskommunikation. Geschäft mit der Einzelheit oder sozialer Zwang?* (pp. 133–158). Wiesbaden, Germany: VS Verlag.
- Bretschneider, F., Neller, K., & Anderson, C. J. (2006). Candidate images in the 2005 German national election. *German Politics*, 15(4), 481–499.
- Briggs, A., & Burke, P. (2002). *A social history of the media. From Gutenberg to the Internet*. Cambridge, UK: Blackwell.
- Bucy, E. P. (2000). Emotional and evaluative consequences of inappropriate leader displays. *Communication Research*, 27(2), 194–226.
- Bucy, E. P., & Grabe, M. E. (2007). Taking television seriously: A sound and image bite analysis of presidential campaign coverage, 1992–2004. *Journal of Communication*, 57(4), 652–675.
- Campbell, A., Converse, P. E., Miller, W. E., & Stokes, D. E. (1980). *The American voter*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Campus, D. (2002). Leaders, dreams and journeys: Italy's new political communication. *Journal of Modern Italian studies*, 7(2), 171–191.
- Center for Media and Public Affairs (1992). Battle of the sound bites. *Media Monitor August/September 1992*, 6(7).
- Cohen, J. (1989). Deliberation and democratic legitimacy. In A. Hamlin & P. Pettit (Eds.), *The good polity* (pp. 17–34). Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
- Converse, P. E., & Dupeux, G. (1966). De Gaulle and Eisenhower: The public image of the victorious general. In A. Campbell, P. E. Converse, W. E. Miller & D. E. Stokes (Eds.), *Elections and the political order* (pp. 292–345). New York: Wiley.
- Corner, J. (2000). Mediated persona and political culture: Dimensions of structure and process. *European Journal of Cultural Studies*, 3(3), 386–402.
- Curran, J., Iyengar, S., Lund, A. B., & Salovaara-Moring, I. (2009). Media systems, public knowledge and democracy: A comparative study. *European Journal of Communication*, 24(1), 5–26.
- Dalton, R. J. (2000). Citizen attitudes and political behaviour. *Comparative Political Studies*, 33(6/7), 912–940.
- Dalton, R. J., & Wattenberg, M. P. (1993). The not so simple act of voting. In A. W. Finifter (Ed.), *Political science: The state of the discipline II* (pp. 193–218). Washington, DC: American Political Science Association.
- Dalton, R. J., McAllister, I., & Wattenberg, M. P. (2000). The consequences of partisan dealignment. In R. J. Dalton & M. P. Wattenberg (Eds.), *Parties without partisans: Political change in advanced industrial democracies* (pp. 37–63). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Dennis, J., Chaffee, S. H., & Choe, S. Y. (1979). Impact on partisan, image, and issue voting. In S. Kraus (Ed.), *The Great Debates. Carter vs. Ford 1976* (pp. 314–330). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Dillenburger, M., Holtz-Bacha, C., & Lessinger, E.-M. (2005). It's Youyoupe! Die Plakatkampagnen der Parteien im Europawahlkampf 2004 [It's Youyoupe! The parties' campaign posters in the EP elections 2004]. In C. Holtz-Bacha (Ed.), *Europawahl 2004. Die Massenmedien im Europawahlkampf* (pp. 35–64). Wiesbaden, Germany: VS.
- Downs, A. (1968). *Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie* [Economic theories of democracy]. Tübingen, Germany: Mohr.
- Easton, D. (1965). *A systems analysis of political life*. New York: Wiley.
- Ersson, S., & Lane, J.-E. (1998). Electoral instability and party system change in Western Europe. In P. Penning & J.-E. Lane (Eds.), *Comparing party system change* (pp. 23–39). London: Routledge.
- Esser, F., Holtz-Bacha, C., & Lessinger, E.-M. (2008). A low-key affair: German parties' political advertising. In L. L. Kaid (Ed.), *The EU expansion: Communicating shared sovereignty in the parliamentary elections* (pp. 65–84). New York: Peter Lang.
- Falter, J. W., & Rattinger, H. (1983). Parteien, Kandidaten und politische Streifragagen bei der Bundestagswahl 1980: Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Normal-Vote-Analyse [Parties, candidates and political issues in the Bundestag elections 1980: Opportunities and limitations of the normal-vote-analysis]. In M. Kaase & H.-D. Klingemann (Eds.), *Wahlen und politisches System. Analysen aus Anlaß der Bundestagswahl 1980* (pp. 320–421). Opladen, Germany: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Farnsworth, S. J., & Licher, S. R. (2007). *The nightly news nightmare: Television's coverage of U.S. presidential elections, 1988–2004* (2nd ed.). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Ferree, M. M., Gamson, W. A., Gerhards, J., & Rucht, D. (2002). *Shaping abortion discourse. Democracy and the public sphere in Germany and the United States*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Florida, M. P., Abrams, S., & Pope, J. (2003). The 2000 U.S. presidential election: Can retrospective voting be saved. *British Journal of Political Science*, 33, 163–187.
- Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. E. (1984). *Social cognition*. New York: Random House.
- Foley, M. (2000). *The British presidency. Tony Blair and the politics of public leadership*. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press.
- Fraenkel, E. (1991). Strukturanalyse der modernen Demokratie [Structural analysis of modern democracy]. In E. Fraenkel (Ed.), *Deutschland und die westlichen Demokratien* (pp. 326–359). Frankfurt a. M., Germany: Suhrkamp.
- Freedman, P., Franz, M., & Goldstein, K. (2004). Campaign advertising and democratic citizenship. *American Journal of Political Science*, 48(4), 723–741.
- Fuchs, D., & Kühnel, S. (1994). Wählen als rationales Handeln: Anmerkungen zum Nutzen des Rational-Choice-Ansatzes in der empirischen Wahlforschung [Voting as rational action: Notes on the use of the rational choice approach in empirical election research]. In H.-D. Klingemann & M. Kaase (Eds.), *Wahlen und Wähler. Analysen aus Anlaß der Bundestagswahl 1990* (pp. 305–334). Opladen, Germany: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Gabriel, O. W., & Keil, S. I. (2005). Empirische Wahlforschung in Deutschland: Kritik und Entwicklungsperspektiven [Empirical election research in Germany: Critical summary and perspectives for the future]. In J. W. Falter & H. Schoen (Eds.), *Handbuch Wahlforschung* (pp. 611–641). Wiesbaden, Germany: VS.
- Gabriel, O. W., & Keil, S. I. (2007). Kandidatenorientierungen in Teilerkatoraten und Wahlverhalten [Orientations towards candidates in parts of the electorate and electoral behaviour]. In H. Rattinger, O. W. Gabriel & J. W. Falter (Eds.), *Der gesamtdeutsche Wähler. Stabilität und Wandel des Wählerverhaltens im wiedervereinigten Deutschland* (pp. 357–384). Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos.
- Gabriel, O. W., & Vetter, A. (1998). Bundestagswahlen als Kanzlerwahlen? Kandidatenorientierungen und Wahlentscheidungen im parteienstaatlichen Parlamentarismus [German national elections as chancellor elections? Orientations towards candidates and voting decisions in parliamentarism]. In M. Kaase & H.-D. Klingemann (Eds.), *Wahlen und Wähler. Analysen aus Anlaß der Bundestagswahl 1990* (pp. 305–334). Opladen, Germany: Westdeutscher Verlag.

- mann (Eds.), *Wahlen und Wähler. Analysen aus Anlass der Bundestagswahl 1994* (pp. 505–536). Opladen, Germany: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Galtung, J., & Ruge, M. H. (1965). The structure of foreign news. The presentation of the Congo, Cuba and Cyprus crises in four Norwegian newspapers. *Journal of Peace Research*, 2, 64–91.
- Genz, A., Schoenbach, K., & Semetko, H. A. (2001). "Amerikanisierung"? Politik in den Fernsehnachrichten während der Bundestagswahlkämpfe 1990–1998 ["Americanization"? Politics in the TV news during the German national election campaigns 1990–1998]. In H.-D. Kingemann & M. Kaase (Eds.), *Wahlen und Wähler. Analysen aus Anlass der Bundestagswahl 1998* (pp. 401–414). Wiesbaden, Germany: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Gerhards, J. (1993). Westeuropäische Integration und die Schwierigkeiten der Entstehung einer europäischen Öffentlichkeit [Western European integration and the difficulties of the emergence of a European public sphere]. *Zeitschrift für Soziologie*, 22(2), 96–110.
- Gilens, M., Vavreck, L., & Cohen, M. (2007). The mass media and the public's assessments of presidential candidates, 1952–2000. *The Journal of Politics*, 69(4), 1160–1175.
- Graber, D. A. (1972). Personal qualities in presidential images. The contribution of the press. *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 16, 46–76.
- Graber, D. A. (2001). *Processing politics. Learning from television in the Internet age*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Graber, D. A. (2006). *Mass media and American politics* (7th ed.). Washington, DC: CQ Press.
- Gronbeck, B. E., & Wiese, D. R. (2005). The repersonalization of presidential campaigning in 2004. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 49(4), 520–534.
- Hallén, O. (1998). Personalization in historical descriptions and explanations. *Learning and Instruction*, 8(2), 131–139.
- Hallin, D. C. (1992a). Sound bite news: Television coverage of elections, 1968–1988. *Journal of Communication*, 42(2), 5–24.
- Hallin, D. C. (1992b). The passing of the "High Modernism" of American journalism. *Journal of Communication*, 42(3), 14–25.
- Hallin, D. C., & Mancini, P. (1984). Speaking of the president. *Theory and Society*, 13, 829–850.
- Hallin, D. C., & Mancini, P. (2003). Amerikanisierung, Globalisierung und Säkularisierung: Zur Konvergenz von Mediensystemen und politischer Kommunikation in westlichen Demokratien [Americanization, globalization and secularization: On the convergence of media systems and political communication in Western democracies]. In F. Esser & B. Pfetsch (Eds.), *Politische Kommunikation im internationalen Vergleich. Grundlagen. Anwendungen. Perspektiven* (pp. 35–55). Opladen, Germany: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Hallin, D. C., & Mancini, P. (2004). *Comparing media systems. Three models of media and politics*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Hodess, R., Tedesco, J. C., & Kaid, L. L. (2000). British party election broadcasts. A comparison of 1992 and 1997. *The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics*, 5(4), 55–70.
- Hoffmann, J., & Raupp, J. (2006). Politische Personalisierung [Political personalization]. *Publizistik*, 51(4), 456–478.
- Holtz-Bacha, C. (1999). Mass media and elections. An impressive body of research. In H.-B. Brosius & C. Holtz-Bacha (Eds.), *The German Communication Yearbook* (pp. 39–68). Cresskill, NY: Hampton Press.
- Holtz-Bacha, C. (2000). *Wahlwerbung als Politische Kultur. Parteienspots im Fernsehen 1957–1998* [Canvassing as political culture. Party ads on TV 1957–1998]. Wiesbaden, Germany: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Holtz-Bacha, C. (2001a). Das Private in der Politik: Ein neuer Medientrend? [The private in politics: A new media trend?] *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B41–42, 20–26.
- Holtz-Bacha, C. (2001b). Selbstdarstellung der Politik: Die Präsentation von Themen und Kandidaten in den Fernsehspots der Parteien [Selfrepresentation of politics: The presentation of topics and candidates in the parties' TV ads]. In H. Oberreuter (Ed.), *Umbuch '98: Wähler, Parteien, Kommunikation* (pp. 123–137). München, Germany: Olzog.
- Holtz-Bacha, C. (2003). Bundestagswahlkampf 2002. Ich oder der [German national election campaign 2002: Me or him?]. In C. Holtz-Bacha (Ed.), *Die Massenmedien im Wahlkampf. Die Bundestagswahl 2002* (pp. 9–28). Wiesbaden, Germany: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Holtz-Bacha, C. (2004). Germany: How the private life of politicians go into the media. *Parliamentary Affairs*, 57(1), 41–52.
- Holtz-Bacha, C. (2006a). Personalisiert und emotional: Strategien des modernen Wahlkampfes [Personalized and emotional: Strategies of modern election campaigns]. *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, 7, 11–19.
- Holtz-Bacha, C. (2006b). Bundestagswahl 2005 — Die Überraschungswahl [German national election 2005 — The surprising election]. In C. Holtz-Bacha (Ed.), *Die Massenmedien im Wahlkampf. Die Bundestagswahl 2005* (pp. 5–31). Wiesbaden, Germany: VS.
- Holtz-Bacha, C., & Lessinger, E.-M. (2006). Wie die Lustlosigkeit kontroversiert wurde: Fernsehwerbung 2005 [How the Inactivity was foiled: Political advertising on TV 2005]. In C. Holtz-Bacha (Ed.), *Die Massenmedien im Wahlkampf. Die Bundestagswahl 2005* (pp. 164–182). Wiesbaden, Germany: VS.
- Holtz-Bacha, C., Lessinger, E.-M., & Hettcheimer, M. (1998). Personalisierung als Strategie der Wahlwerbung [Personalization as strategy of political advertisement]. In K. Imhof & P. Schulz (Eds.), *Die Veröffentlichung des Privaten — Die Privatisierung des Öffentlichen* (pp. 240–250). Wiesbaden, Germany: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Huber, G. A., & Arceneaux, K. (2007). Identifying the persuasive effects of presidential advertising. *American Journal of Political Science*, 51(4), 957–977.
- Iyengar, S. (1989). How citizens think about national issues: A matter of responsibility. *American Journal of Political Science*, 33(4), 878–900.
- Iyengar, S. (2008). Priming theory. In W. Donsbach (Ed.), *The International Encyclopedia of Communication*. Blackwell Reference Online.
- Iyengar, S., & Kinder, D. R. (1987). *News that matters*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Jamieson, K. H. (1992). *Dirty politics: Deception, distraction and democracy*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Jamieson, K. H. (1993). The subversive effects of a focus on strategy in news of presidential campaigns. In *1-800-President. The Report of the Twentieth century fund task force on television and the campaign of 1992* (pp. 35–61). New York: The Twentieth Century Fund Press.

- Jamieson, K. H. (1996). *Packaging the presidency. A history and criticism of presidential campaign advertising* (3rd ed.). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Jamieson, K. H. (2000). *Everything you think you know about politics... And why you're wrong*. New York: Basic Books.
- Jamieson, K. H., & Birdsell, D. (1988). *Presidential debates: The challenge of creating an informed electorate*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Jamieson, K. H., & Waldman, P. (2003). *The press effect: Politicians, journalists and the stories that shape the political world*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Jamieson, K. H., Hagen, M. G., Orr, D., Silaman, L., Morse, S., & Kim, K. (2000). What did the leading candidate say and did it matter? *Annals AAPSS*, 572, 12-16.
- Johnson, A., & Kaid, L. L. (2002). Image ads and issue ads in U.S. presidential advertising: Using videostyle to explore stylistic differences in televised political ads from 1952 to 2000. *Journal of Communication*, 52(2), 281-300.
- Jucknat, K. (2007). Köpfe statt Themen? Köpfe und Themen!: Die Personalisierung der Wahlkampfberichterstattung in Deutschland und in den USA [Heads instead of topics? Heads and topics!: The Personalization of the election campaign coverage in Germany and the USA]. *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen (ZParl)*, 38(1), 147-159.
- Just, M., Crigler, A., Alger, D., Cook, T., Kern, M., & West, D. (1996). *Crosswalk: citizens, candidates, and the media in a presidential campaign*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Kaase, M. (1994). Is there personalization in politics? Candidates and voting behavior in Germany. *International Political Science Review*, 15(3), 211-230.
- Kaase, M. (2000). Entwicklung und Stand der empirischen Wahlforschung in Deutschland [Development and status quo of empirical election research in Germany]. In M. Klein, W. Jagodzinski, E. Mochmann & D. Ohr (Eds.), *50 Jahre Empirische Wahlforschung in Deutschland. Entwicklung, Befunde, Perspektiven. Daten* (pp. 17-40). Wiesbaden, Germany: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Kaid, L. L., & Strömbeck, J. (2008). Election news coverage around the world: A comparative perspective. In L. L. Kaid & J. Strömbeck (Eds.), *The Handbook of election news coverage around the world* (pp. 421-431). New York: Routledge.
- Kaltefleiter, W. (1981). Personalisierung [Personalization]. In M. Greiffenhagen, S. Greiffenhagen & R. Prätorius (Eds.), *Handwörterbuch zur politischen Kultur in Deutschland. Ein Lehr- und Nachschlagewerk* (pp. 296-299). Opladen, Germany: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Karvonen, L. (2007, September). *The personalization of politics. What does research tell us so far, and what further research is in order?* Paper presented at the ECPR Conference, Pisa, Italy.
- Keeter, S. (1987). The illusion of intimacy: Television and the role of candidate personal qualities in voter choice. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 51, 344-358.
- Kellermann, C. (2007). Trends and Constellations: Klassische Bestimmungsfaktoren des Wahlverhaltens bei den Bundestagswahlen 1990-2005 [Trends and constellations: Classical determinants of the electoral behaviour in the German national elections 1990-2005]. In H. Ratinger, O. W. Gabriel & J. W. Falter (Eds.), *Der gesamtdeutsche Wähler. Stabilität und Wandel des Wählerverhaltens im wiedervereinigten Deutschland* (pp. 297-328). Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos.
- Keppinger, H. M. (1982). Visual biases in television campaign coverage. *Communication Research*, 9(3), 432-446.
- Keppinger, H. M. (1998). *Die Demontage der Politik in der Informationsgesellschaft* [The disassembly of politics in the information society]. Freiburg, Germany: Alber.
- Keppinger, H. M., & Donsbach, W. (1987). The influence of camera perspectives on the perception of a politician by supporters, opponents, and neutral viewers. In D. L. Paletz (Ed.), *Political communication research: Approaches, studies, assessments* (pp. 62-72). Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
- Keppinger, H. M., & Maurer, M. (2005). *Abschied vom rationalen Wähler* [Goodbye to the rational voter]. Freiburg, Germany: Alber.
- Keppinger, H. M., Brosius, H. B., & Dahlmann, S. (1994). Charakter oder Sachkompetenz von Politiker. Woran orientieren sich die Wähler? [Character or issue competence of politicians. What do voters use for orientation?]. In H.-D. Klingemann & M. Kaase (Eds.), *Wahlen und Wähler. Analysen aus Anlaß der Bundestagswahl 1990* (pp. 472-505). Opladen, Germany: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Kennell, S. (1988). *Going public. New strategies of presidential leadership*. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
- Kim, K., & McCombs, M. (2007). News story descriptions and the public's opinions of political candidates. *Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly*, 84(2), 299-314.
- Kim, S., Scheufele, D. A., & Shanahan, J. (2005). Who cares about the issues? Issue voting and the role of news media during the 2000 U.S. presidential election. *Journal of Communication*, 55(1), 103-121.
- Kindelmann, K. (1994). *Kanzlerkandidaten in den Medien. Eine Analyse des Wahlgahres 1990* [Candidates for chancellor in the media. An analysis of the election year 1990]. Opladen, Germany: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Kinder, D. (1986). Presidential character revisited. In R. R. Lau & D. O. Sears (Eds.), *Political cognition: the 19th annual Carnegie Symposium on cognition* (pp. 233-255). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
- King, A. (2002). Conclusions and implications. In A. King (Ed.), *Leaders' personalities and the outcomes of democratic elections* (pp. 210-221). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Klein, M., & Ohr, D. (2000). Gerhard oder Helmut? 'Unpolitische' Kandidateneigenschaften und ihr Einfluss auf die Wahlentscheidung bei der Bundestagswahl 1998 [Gerhard or Helmut? 'Unpolitical' traits of the candidates and their impact on the voting decisions in the German national elections 1998]. *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, 41(2), 199-224.
- Klein, M., & Ohr, D. (2001). Die Wahrnehmung der politischen und persönlichen Eigenschaften von Helmut Kohl und Gerhard Schröder und ihr Einfluss auf die Wahlentscheidung bei der Bundestagswahl 1998 [The perception of Helmut Kohl's and Gerhard Schröder's political and personal traits and their impact on the voting decisions in the German national elections 1998]. In H.-D. Klingemann & M. Kaase (Eds.), *Wahlen und Wähler. Analysen aus Anlaß der Bundestagswahl 1998* (pp. 91-132). Wiesbaden, Germany: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Klingemann, H. D., & Wessels, B. (1999). Political consequences of Germany's mixed-member system: Personalization at the grass-root? *Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB): Discussion Paper FS III*, 99-205.
- Krewel, M. (2008). Wahlkampfkommunikation im intertemporalen Vergleich [Campaign communication in a longitudinal comparison]. In E. Aydin, M. Begenat, C. Michalek, J. Schemann & I. Stefes (Eds.), *Düsseldorfer Forum Politische Kommunikation. Schriftenreihe DFPK* (Vol. 3, pp. 169-197). Berlin, Germany: LIT.
- Kriesi, H. (2001). Die Rolle der Öffentlichkeit im politischen Entscheidungsprozess. Ein konzeptueller Rahmen für ein international vergleichendes Forschungsprojekt

- [The public's role in the process of political decision-making. A conceptual frame for an international comparative research project]. *Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB): Discussion Paper*, 1-701.
- Lane, R. E. (1978). Interpersonal relations and leadership in a "cold society." *Comparative Politics*, 10, 443-459.
- Lang, G. E., & Lang, K. (1979). Immediate and mediated responses: First debate. In S. Kraus (Ed.), *The Great Debates: Carter vs. Ford 1976* (pp. 298-313). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Langer, A. I. (2006). *The politicisation of private persona: The case of Tony Blair in historical perspective*. Submitted for the PhD in Media and Communication, London School of Economics.
- Langer, A. I. (2007). A historical exploration of the personalisation of politics in the print media: The British Prime Ministers (1945-1999). *Parliamentary Affairs*, 60(3), 371-387.
- Lass, J. (1995). *Vorstellungsbilder über Kanzlerkandidaten. Zur Diskussion um die Personalisierung der Politik* [Images of candidates for chancellor. On the discussion about the personalization of politics]. Wiesbaden, Germany: Deutscher Universitätsverlag.
- Lau, R. R., & Redlawsk, D. P. (2001). Advantages and disadvantages of cognitive heuristics in political decision making. *American Journal of Political Science*, 45, 951-971.
- Lichter, R., Amundson, D., & Noyes, R. (1988). *The video game: Network coverage of the 1988 primaries*. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute.
- Liphardt, A. (1999). *Patterns of democracy: Government forms and performance in thirty-six countries*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Linden, M. (2003). Abschied von der Volkspartei?: Zur These von der "Personalisierung der Politik" [Goodbye to the catch-all party?: On the thesis about the "personalization of politics"]. *Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft*, 13(3), 1205-1234.
- Lowry, D. T., & Shidler, J. A. (1995). The biters and the bitten: An analysis of network TV news bias in campaign '92. *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly*, 69, 341-361.
- Maier, J. (2009). Was die Bürger über Politik (nicht) wissen — und was die Massenmedien damit zu tun haben — ein Forschungsüberblick [What citizens (do not) know about politics — and what mass media have to do with it — a state of research]. In B. Pfetsch & F. Marcinkowski (Eds.), *Politik in der Mediendemokratie* (pp. 393-414). Wiesbaden, Germany: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
- Maier, J., & Maier, M. (2008). The reception of European election campaigns and political involvement. In L. L. Kaid (Ed.), *The EU expansion: Communicating shared sovereignty in the parliamentary elections* (pp. 85-100). New York: Peter Lang.
- Mancini, P., & Swanson, D. L. (1996). Politics, media, and modern democracy: Introduction. In D. L. Swanson & P. Mancini (Eds.), *Politics, media, and modern democracy: An international study of innovations in electoral campaigning and their consequences* (pp. 1-26). Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Marcinkowski, F., & Gregor, V. (2000). Die Personalisierung politischer Kommunikation im Fernsehen. Ein Ergebnis der—"Amerikanisierung" [The personalization of political communication on TV. A result of the "Americanization"]. In K. Kamps (Ed.), *Trans-Atlantik—Trans-Portabel? Die Amerikanisierungsthese in der politischen Kommunikation* (pp. 179-197). Wiesbaden, Germany: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Maurer, M., & Reinemann, C. (2007). Personalisierung durch Priming. Die Wirkungen des TV-Duells auf die Urteilskriterien der Wähler [Personalization through priming. The effects of televised debates on citizens' evaluation standards]. In M. Maurer, C. Reinemann, J. Maier, & M. Maier (Eds.), *Schroder gegen Merkel. Wahrnehmung und Wirkung des TV-Duells 2005 im Ost-West-Vergleich* (pp. 111-128). Wiesbaden, Germany: VS.
- Mazzoleni, G. (2000). A return to civic and political engagement prompted by personalized political leadership? *Political Communication*, 17, 325-328.
- McAllister, I. (2007). The personalization of politics. In R. J. Dalton & H.-D. Klingemann (Eds.), *The Oxford handbooks of political science: The Oxford handbook of political behaviour* (pp. 571-588). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Meyer, C. O. (1999). Political legitimacy and the invisibility of politics: Exploring the European Union's communication deficit. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 9(1), 617-639.
- Miller, A. H., & Mackuen, M. (1979). Informing the electorate: A national study. In S. Kraus (Ed.), *The Great Debates: Carter vs. Ford 1976* (pp. 269-297). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Miller, A. H., Wattenberg, M. P., & Malanchuk, O. (1986). Schematic assessments of presidential candidates. *American Political Science Review*, 80(2), 521-540.
- Moy, P., & Gasili, J. (2006). Predicting deliberative conversation: The impact of discussion networks, media use, and political cognitions. *Political Communication*, 23(4), 443-460.
- Mughan, A. (2000). *Media and the presidentialization of parliamentary elections*. New York: Palgrave.
- Mutz, D. C. (2007). Effects of "in-your-face" television discourse on perceptions of a legitimate opposition. *American Political Science Review*, 101(4), 621-635.
- Nohlen, D. (2002). Legitimität [Legitimacy]. In D. Nohlen (Ed.), *Kleines Lexikon der Politik* (pp. 275-277). Bonn, Germany: C.H. Beck.
- Oegema, D., & Kleinijenhuis, J. (2000). Personalization in political television news: A 13-wave survey study to assess effects of text and footage. *Communications*, 25(1), 43-60.
- Ohr, D. (2000). Wird das Wählerverhalten zunehmend personalisierter, oder ist jede Wahl anders? Kandidatenorientierungen und Wahlentscheidung in Deutschland 1961 bis 1998 [Is the voters' behaviour increasingly personalized, or is each election different? Orientation towards candidates and voting decision in Germany 1961 till 1998]. In M. Klein, W. Jagodzinski, E. Mochmann & D. Ohr (Eds.), *50 Jahre empirische Wahlforschung in Deutschland. Entwicklung, Befunde, Perspektiven, Daten* (pp. 272-307). Wiesbaden, Germany: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Ohr, D. (2002). Der personalisierte Wähler. Welche Rolle die Bewertung politischer Kandidaten für das Wählerurteil spielt [The personalized voter. The role of the evaluation of political candidates for the voters' decision]. *Planung & Analyse*, 1, 16-20.
- Olson, M. (1965). *The logic of collective action*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Page, B. I. (1978). *Choices and echoes in presidential elections: Rational man and electoral democracy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

- Pan, Z., & Kosicki, G. M. (1997). Priming and media impact on the evaluation of the president's performance. *Communication Research*, 24(1), 3-30.
- Pappi, F. U., & Shikano, S. (2001). Personalisierung der Politik in Mehrparteiensystemen am Beispiel deutscher Bundestagswahlen seit 1980 [Personalization of politics in multi-party systems using the example of German national elections since 1980]. *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, 42(3), 355-387.
- Patterson, T. E. (1989). The press and candidate images. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, 1(2), 123-135.
- Patterson, T. E. (1991). More style than substance: Television news in U.S. national elections. *Political Communication and Persuasion*, 8, 145-161.
- Patterson, T. E. (1993a). *Out of order*. New York: Vintage.
- Patterson, T. E. (1993b). Let the press be the press: Principles of campaign reform. In *1-800-President. The report of the twentieth century fund task force on television and the campaign of 1992* (pp. 91-109). New York: The Twentieth Century Fund Press.
- Pennings, P., & Lane, J.-E. (1998). Introduction. In P. Pennings & J.-E. Lane (Eds.), *Comparing party system change* (pp. 1-19). London: Routledge.
- Peter, J., & de Vreese, C. H. (2004). In search of Europe: A cross-national comparative study of the European Union in national television news. *The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics*, 9(3), 3-24.
- Popkin, S. L. (1991). *The reasoning voter: communication and persuasion in presidential campaigns*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Prior, M. (2003). Any good news in soft news? The impact of soft news preferences on political knowledge. *Political Communication*, 20, 149-171.
- Radunski, P. (1980). *Wahlkämpfe. Moderne Wahlkampfführung als politische Kommunikation*. München, Germany: Olzog.
- Rahar, G., & Sheater, T. (2007). The personalization(s) of politics: Israel, 1949-2003. *Political Communication*, 41(1), 65-80.
- Rahn, W. M., Aldrich, J. H., Borgida, E., & Sullivan, J. L. (1990). A social-cognitive model of candidate appraisal. In J. A. Ferrehohn & J. H. Kuklinski (Eds.), *Information and democratic processes* (pp. 136-159). Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Reinemann, C. (2007). Völlig anderer Ansicht. Die Medienberichterstattung über das TV-Duell [Completely different views. The media news coverage about the televised debate]. In M. Maurer, C. Reinemann, J. Maier, & M. Maier (Eds.), *Schröder gegen Merkel. Wahrnehmung und Wirkung des TV-Duells 2005 im Ost-West-Vergleich* (pp. 167-194). Wiesbaden, Germany: VS.
- Reinemann, C., & Wilke, J. (2007). It's the debates, stupid! How the introduction of televised debates changed the portrayal of chancellor candidates in the German press, 1949-2005. *The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics*, 12(4), 92-111.
- Robinson, M. J., & Sheehan, M. A. (1983). *Over the wire and on TV: CBS and UPI in campaign '80*. New York: Sage.
- Romero, D. W. (1989). The changing American voter revisited: Candidate evaluations in presidential elections, 1952 to 1984. *American Politics Research*, 17, 409-421.
- Sarcinelli, U. (1987). *Symbolische Politik* [Symbolic politics]. Opladen, Germany: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Sarcinelli, U. (1990). Auf dem Weg in eine kommunikative Demokratie? Demokratische Streitkultur als Element politischer Kultur [On the track to a communicative democracy? Democratic debating culture as an element of political culture]. In U. Sarcinelli (Ed.), *Demokratische Streitkultur. Theoretische Grundpositionen und Handlungsalternativen in Politikfeldern* (pp. 29-51). Bonn, Germany: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung.
- Scammell, M., & Langer, A. I. (2006). Political advertisement in the United Kingdom. In L. L. Kaid (Ed.), *The SAGE Handbook of political advertising* (pp. 65-82). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Scammell, M., & Semetko, H. A. (2008). Election news coverage in the UK. In J. Strömback & L. L. Kaid (Eds.), *The handbook of election news coverage round the world* (pp. 73-89). New York: Routledge.
- Scheufele, D. A. (2002). Examining differential gains from mass media and their implications for participatory behaviour. *Communication Research*, 29(1), 46-65.
- Schmidt, M. (1995). *Demokratietheorien. Eine Einführung* [Theories of democracy. An introduction]. Opladen, Germany: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Schmitt-Beck, R. (2007). New modes of campaigning. In R. J. Dalton & H.-D. Klingemann (Eds.), *The Oxford handbooks of political science: The Oxford handbook of political behaviour* (pp. 744-764). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Schoen, H. (2005). Wahlkampforschung [Research on election campaigns]. In J. W. Falter & H. Schoen (Eds.), *Handbuch Wahlforschung* (pp. 503-542). Wiesbaden, Germany: VS.
- Schoen, H. (2007). Campaigns, candidate evaluations, and vote choice: Evidence from German federal election campaigns, 1980-2002. *Electoral Studies*, 26(2), 324-337.
- Schoen, H. (2009). Wahlsoziologie [Political sociology]. In V. Kaina & A. Römmele (Eds.), *Political Sociology* (pp. 181-208). Wiesbaden, Germany: VS.
- Schoen, H., & Weins, C. (2005). Der sozialpsychologische Ansatz zur Erklärung von Wahlverhalten [The socialpsychological approach to voting behaviour]. In J. W. Falter & H. Schoen (Eds.), *Handbuch Wahlforschung* (pp. 187-242). Wiesbaden, Germany: VS.
- Schoenbach, K. (1994). The "Americanization" of German election campaigns: Any impact on the voters? In D. L. Swanson & P. Mancini (Eds.), *Politics, media and modern democracy. An international study of innovations in electoral campaigning* (pp. 91-104). Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Schulz, W. (1997). *Politische Kommunikation: theoretische Ansätze und Ergebnisse empirischer Forschung* [Political communication: Theoretical approaches and results of empirical research]. Opladen, Germany: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Schulz, W., & Zeh, R. (2003). Kanzler und Kanzlerkandidaten in den Fernsehnachrichten [Chancellors and candidates for chancellor in TV news]. In C. Holtz-Bacha (Ed.), *Die Massenmedien im Wahlkampf. Die Bundestagswahl 2002* (pp. 57-79). Wiesbaden, Germany: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Schulz, W., & Zeh, R. (2005). The changing election coverage of German television. A content analysis: 1990-2002. *Communications*, 30, 385-407.
- Schulz, W., & Zeh, R. (2006). Die Kampagne im Fernsehen — Agens und Indikator des Wandels. Ein Vergleich der Kandidatendarstellung [The campaign on TV — medium and indicator of change. A comparison of the candidates' presentation]. In C. Holtz-Bacha (Ed.), *Die Massenmedien im Wahlkampf. Die Bundestagswahl 2005* (pp. 277-305). Wiesbaden, Germany: VS.
- Schulz, W., Zeh, R., & Quiring, O. (2005). Voters in a changing media environment. *European Journal of Communication*, 20(1), 55-88.
- Sears, D. O., & Chaffee, S. H. (1979). Uses and effects of the 1976 Debates: An overview of empirical studies. In S. Kraus (Ed.), *The Great Debates. Carter vs. Ford 1976* (pp. 223-261). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

- Shenhav, S. R., & Shefter, T. (2008). From inter-party debate to inter-personal polemic: Media coverage of internal and external party disputes in Israel, 1949–2003. *Party Politics*, 14(6), 706–725.
- Siebert, G. (2001). *Medien, Marken, Management: Relevanz, Spezifika und Implikationen einer medienökonomischen Profilierungsstrategie* [Media, brands, management: Relevance, specifics and implications of a media economic profile strategy]. München, Germany: Fischer.
- Sigel, R. S. (1969). Image of the American presidency: Part II of an exploration into popular views of presidential power. In A. Wildavsky (Ed.), *The Presidency* (pp. 296–309). Boston: Little, Brown & Company.
- Sigelman, L., & Bullock, D. (1991). Candidates, issues, horse races, and hoopla: Presidential campaign coverage, 1888–1988. *American Politics Quarterly*, 19, 5–32.
- Simons, H. W., & Leibowitz, K. (1979). Shifts in Canadian images. In S. Kraus (Ed.), *The Great Debates: Carter vs. Ford 1976* (pp. 398–404). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Stern, E., & Graner, J. (2002). It's the candidate stupid? Personalisierung der bundesdeutschen Wahlkämpfe [It's the candidate stupid? Personalization of the German national election campaigns]. In T. Berg (Ed.), *Moderner Wahlkampf. Blick hinter die Kulissen* (pp. 145–170). Opladen, Germany: Leske + Budrich.
- Street, J. (2004). Celebrity politicians: Popular culture and political representation. *The British Journal of Politics & International Relations*, 6, 435–452.
- Strömbeck, J., & Dimitrova, D. V. (2006). Political and media systems matter: A comparison of election news coverage in Sweden and the United States. *The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics* 11(4), 131–147.
- Swanson, D. L., & Mancini, P. (1996). Patterns of modern electoral campaigning and their consequences. In D. L. Swanson & P. Mancini (Eds.), *Politics, media, and modern democracy: An international study of innovations in electoral campaigning and their consequences* (pp. 247–267). Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Van Zoonen, L. (2005). *Entertaining the citizen. When politics and popular culture converge*. Lanham, Boulder, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Van Zoonen, L. (2006). The person, the political and the popular: A woman's guide to celebrity politics. *European Journal of Cultural Studies*, 9(3), 287–301.
- Van Zoonen, L., & Holtz-Bacha, C. (2000). Personalisation in Dutch and German politics: The case of talk show. *The Public*, 7(2), 45–56.
- Wattenberg, M. P. (1995). *The rise of candidate-centered politics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Webb, P., & Pogunke, T. (2005). The presidentialization of contemporary democratic politics: Evidence, causes, and consequences. In T. Pogunke & P. Webb (Eds.), *The presidentialization of politics in democratic societies* (pp. 336–356). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Weber, M. (2005). *Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen* [Economic ethics of the world religions]. Tübingen, Germany: Mohr.
- West, D. (1997). *Air wars. Television advertising in election campaigns 1952–1996* (2nd ed.). Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly.
- Wiesendahl, E. (2001). Sammelrezension: Parteien im Epochenwechsel? Neue Literatur zum organisatorischen Strukturwandel politischer Parteien [Parties in the change of epochs? New literature about the organizational change of political parties]. *Politische Vierteljahrschrift*, 42, 734–743.
- Wille, J., & Reinemann, C. (2000). *Kanzlerkandidaten in der Wahlberichterstattung. Eine vergleichende Studie zu den Bundestagswahlen 1949–1998* [Candidates for chancellor in the campaign coverage. A comparative study of German national elections from 1949 to 1998]. Köln, Germany: Böhlau.
- Wille, J., & Reinemann, C. (2001). Do the candidates matter? Long-term trends of campaign coverage: A study of the German press since 1949. *European Journal of Communication*, 16(3), 291–314.
- Wille, J., & Reinemann, C. (2006). Die Normalisierung des Sonderfalls? Die Wahlkampfberichterstattung der Presse 2005 im Langzeitvergleich [The normalization of the exception? Campaign coverage in the press 2005 — a long-term comparison]. In C. Holtz-Bacha (Ed.), *Die Massenmedien im Wahlkampf. Die Bundestagswahl 2005* (pp. 306–337). Wiesbaden, Germany: VS.
- Wille, J., & Sprot, C. (2009). "Hindenburg wählen, Hitler schlagen!" Wahlkampf-kommunikation bei den Reichspräsidentenwahlen in der Weimarer Republik. [Elect Hindenburg, win against Hitler. Campaign communication in the German Reich election in the Weimar Republic]. In H. Kaspar, H. Schoen, S. Schumann, & J. R. Winkler (Eds.), *Politik — Wissenschaft — Medien. Festschrift für Jürgen W. Falter zum 65. Geburtstag* (pp. 277–306). Wiesbaden, Germany: VS.
- Wiórkowski, A., & Holtz-Bacha, C. (2005). Und es lohnt sich doch. Personalisierungsstrategien im Europawahlkampf [However it's profitable. Personalization strategies in the European election campaign]. In C. Holtz-Bacha (Ed.), *Europawahlkampf 2004 Die Massenmedien im Europawahlkampf* (pp. 174–196). Wiesbaden, Germany: VS.
- Wirth, W., & Voigt, R. (1999). Der Aufschwung ist meiner! Personalisierung von Spitzenkandidaten im Fernsehen zur Bundestagswahl 1998 [The boom is mine! Personalization of top candidates on TV during the German national election 1998]. In C. Holtz-Bacha (Ed.), *Wahlkampf in den Medien — Wahlkampf mit den Medien. Ein Reader zum Wahljahr 1998* (pp. 136–161). Opladen, Germany: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Wölfelsfeld, G. (1997). *Media and political conflict. News from the Middle East*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.